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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the relative value that norms have on U.S. nuclear 
policies, particularly on their constraining effect on nuclear weapon use and 
possession. Contemporary academic literature explores how norms constrain the 
use of nuclear arms, but further research is needed to determine how they affect 
policies of possession. Using case studies from the Cold War, this thesis 
presents research indicating that norms have had inconsistent constraining 
effects on nuclear use and possession policies. Upon applying four leading 
theories on how norms affect U.S. nuclear policymaking, it becomes clear that no 
single theory dominated policymakers’ decisions throughout the Cold War. 
Instead, differing circumstances created vast inconsistencies as to the 
constraining effects that norms had on nuclear strategies.  
Today’s policymakers must understand the constraining role that norms 
have on nuclear policy, and that these norms differ in their constraining effects 
when nuclear policies are broadened beyond just those of nuclear use. Nuclear 
policies regarding the possession of nuclear weapons are also influenced by 
norms, but not necessarily in the same way as they are for nuclear use.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary question of this thesis is: Have norms constrained U.S. 
nuclear policies, and if so, how? This thesis will examine prevailing attitudes and 
beliefs concerning nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War and whether those 
norms limited U.S. nuclear policy, and if those effects were consistent over time. 
The answers to these questions will then be applied to how norms affected two 
specific nuclear policies: nuclear use strategies (which will be further divided into 
“first-use” and “retaliatory-use” of nuclear weapons), and strategies concerning 
the possession of nuclear weapons (including both the numbers of nuclear 
weapons and their capabilities). Contemporary academic literature explores how 
norms constrain the use of nuclear weapons, but fails to draw a distinction 
between first-use and retaliatory-use. Additionally, further research is needed to 
determine how the shared expectations for behavior affect policies of possession 
in addition to policies of use. Nuclear strategies have changed tremendously over 
time, the effect that norms have on constraining nuclear policy must be 
understood holistically across a broad range of nuclear use and possession 
policies. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
If norms constrain nuclear policy decisions, then that would constitute 
convincing evidence that American national security strategy is entwined with 
those norms. Norms, as defined by the scholars in the field of nuclear policy, are 
considered to be “shared expectations for behavior held by a community of 
actors”1 or a “standard of right and wrong.”2 Furthermore, the significance that 
policymakers place on norms regarding nuclear weapons may change over time. 
                                            
1 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 22.  
2 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 10.  
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Today’s officials should be able to differentiate how shared expectations of 
behavior affect nuclear policies, past and present, so that they can better 
understand the consequences of their policy choices, as well as anticipate the 
nuclear actions of other states. 
International and domestic expectations surrounding nuclear weapons 
must be understood across a range of nuclear policy options in order to paint an 
accurate picture of constraints and opportunities for American nuclear strategies. 
Contemporary normative theories for nuclear use policy over generalize how 
norms constrain nuclear employment by focusing heavily on policies of first-use 
(i.e., the first state to use nuclear weapons, when nuclear weapons had not been 
used by opposing parties). Thus, they fail to address how norms concerning 
retaliatory-use (i.e., the use of nuclear weapons to thwart an existential threat or 
in response to the use of a weapon of mass destruction against the state or its 
allies) may be very different and inconsistent with acceptable behaviors for first-
use. This thesis will use historical evidence to show that norms had differential 
influence on nuclear use and possession policies. Furthermore, contemporary 
normative literature does not pay adequate attention to normative constraints on 
nuclear possession and force posture policies. Additional research is needed to 
determine how norms can have different constraining affects among varying 
nuclear policies and circumstances.  
International norms have not yet prohibited every possible use of nuclear 
weapons. While generally against the use and possession of nuclear arms, the 
United Nations General Assembly is justified in addressing the legality of nuclear 
policies concerning both the use and possession of nuclear arms. Highlighting a 
distinction between these two policy areas, at the behest of the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), a ruling by the International Criminal Court of Justice 
opinion memo ultimately determined that nuclear weapon use could be justifiable 
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and legal under certain circumstances.3 This is evidence that modern 
expectations of behavior applying to the possession of nuclear weapons may be 
different, or less influential, than those concerning how those weapons are used. 
A greater understanding of the constraining effects that norms have on nuclear 
policy will allow nuclear policymakers to make better-informed decisions 
regarding American national defense strategies.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are numerous potential explanations for how norms have affected 
U.S. nuclear policies. One hypothesis is that they play little role in constraining or 
influencing U.S. nuclear use and possession policies. This result will render any 
differences between the effects that norms had on nuclear use and possession 
strategies as relatively insignificant.  
A second hypothesis is that norms are largely explanatory for constraining 
U.S. nuclear use and possession policies. If this hypothesis is correct, then 
further research into how and under what circumstances these norms affect 
varying nuclear policies would need to be undertaken; such as whether or not the 
accepted behaviors for nuclear first-use policies are equally constraining for 
nuclear retaliatory-use plans, as well as for various nuclear possession policies 
such as numbers of warheads and destructive capability. 
If norms are in any way explanatory for constraining U.S. nuclear policies, 
the relative effects that these norms have on nuclear use policies should be 
compared to their effect on nuclear possession policies. In this situation, one 
hypothesis would be that norms are more (or less) explanatory for constraining 
nuclear use policies than they are for constraining nuclear possession policies. 
An alternative hypothesis to this would be that norms have an inconsistent 
explanatory value for nuclear use and possession policies, making an 
                                            
3 International Criminal Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996,” July 8, 1996, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
index.php?sum=498&p1=3&p2=4&case=95&p3=5.  
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understanding of normative effects very circumstantial. The outcomes of any of 
these three hypotheses would help fill a gap in knowledge that currently exists in 
nuclear policy literature. 
D. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON NUCLEAR USE AND POSSESSION 
Thomas Schelling, an expert on nuclear strategy and arms control, 
declared that, “The most spectacular event of the past half century is one that did 
not occur. We have enjoyed sixty years without nuclear weapons exploded in 
anger.”4 This quote best describes the modern phenomenon of nuclear-armed 
nations refusing to use nuclear weapons in conflict. There exists large bodies of 
research and theories that attempt to explain the key variables that have 
prevented the use of nuclear weapons in anger, and much research exists on 
how norms factor in to non-use. Some theorists argue that norms are highly 
explanatory in preventing the use of nuclear weapons, and some that argue that 
the importance of norms is minimal. Scholars that have explored the explanatory 
power of norms do not always agree on the value that these variables play in 
nuclear policymaking.  
This literature review will point out where these theorists agree and 
disagree, highlighting the areas of knowledge that they have overlooked. There 
are four overall schools of thought on how norms influence state nuclear policy: 
the logic-of-appropriateness school, the military-utility school, the logic-of-
consequences school, and the tradition of non-use school.5  
1. Logic-of-Appropriateness School  
The first school of thought, known as the logic-of-appropriateness (LoA) 
school,” views the constraints placed on the use of nuclear weapons through a 
                                            
4 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 287.  
5 Scott D. Sagan, Daryl G. Press, and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Atomic Aversion: 
Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons,” American 
Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 200, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/
FINAL_APSR_Atomic_Aversion.pdf.  
 5
social-constructivist lens.6 Theorists in this camp regard state decisions to be 
motivated by socially constructed ideas on the appropriate or inappropriate use 
of nuclear arms in certain situations. Ultimately, decision makers base their 
policies upon their internalized notions of right and wrong. Domestic and 
international norms contribute greatly to leadership decisions and can constrain 
their conceptions of appropriate behavior.7 This school places the explanatory 
variables of nuclear non-use under constructive notions of norms, and discounts 
the value of material or realist influences on policymaker decisions.  
Within this LoA umbrella is the conclusion that powerful ethical-norms 
exist against the use of nuclear weapons, so much so that their use has become 
taboo. Nina Tannenwald’s book, The Nuclear Taboo, describes this taboo as a 
“widespread popular revulsion against nuclear weapons and widely held 
inhibitions on their use.”8 Another scholar, Peter Gizewski, describes the taboo 
as “absolute and all-encompassing, the prohibition sets all nuclear weapons 
apart as unique.”9 These authors argue that American policymakers have 
internalized an understanding that the use of nuclear weapons is abhorrent and 
inappropriate behavior. The taboo against the use of nuclear weapons in 
Tannenwald’s theory is not separated between first-use or retaliatory-use, 
instead nuclear employment in any fashion is considered to incur “moral 
opprobrium or political costs,”10 The only weakness to the taboo that 
Tannenwald identifies is regarding nuclear use as a “last resort.”11 
Both Tannenwald and Gizewski claim that the taboo against the use of 
nuclear weapons is closely linked to the United States’ refusal to use the weapon 
                                            
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid., 3.  
8 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 8.  
9 Peter Gizewski, “From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of the World: The Nuclear Taboo in 
International Politics,” International Journal 51, no. 2 (1968): 397–419, http://doi.org/10.2307/
40203121.  
10 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 362.  
11 Ibid., 369.  
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in the Korean War. Tannenwald does not say that a taboo against nuclear use 
existed in the early 1950s, only that the foundation of an emerging taboo began 
in the 1950s. Specifically, she argues that norms were forming against the first-
use of nuclear arms.12 Additionally, she finds evidence that policymaker’s 
decision to refrain from using nuclear weapons in the Vietnam and Gulf Wars 
was constrained by ethical-normative prohibitions against the use of nuclear 
weapons. Over time, she argues, norms against the use of nuclear weapons 
were reinforced so much that the idea of their use today is completely taboo and 
unthinkable. 
Tannenwald argues in her book that, despite America’s explicit policies 
that allow for nuclear use, there is an implicit understanding that their use will 
never be appropriate. Explicitly, in the most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, 
there exist situations wherein U.S. policymakers would consider using nuclear 
weapons, such as using nuclear arms as a last resort option in self-defense.13 
Despite this explicit policy, Tannenwald firmly contends that an implicit taboo 
exists on the use of nuclear weapons today. She concludes that ethical norms 
against any appropriate use for nuclear arms have been “institutionalized and 
internalized to varying degrees in policy.”14 Where Tannenwald’s argument 
differs from other normative arguments concerning nuclear policy is that 
Tannenwald cites evidence that the norms against nuclear use have developed 
into a new category of constraint, that of a “taboo.”  
This thesis will focus only on whether or not international and domestic 
expectations for behavior have constrained nuclear policy, not whether or not 
those expectations have transcended into the definition of a taboo. Furthermore, 
this thesis will look at whether or not social-constructivist norms on nuclear use 
are the same for first-use or retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons. 
                                            
12 Ibid., 10.  
13 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2010), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS121566.  
14 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 386–387.  
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Tannenwald and other social-constructivist scholars find evidence that 
norms against the use of and possession of nuclear weapons exist from the 
international community, religious organizations, and public opinion. From the 
international community, numerous treaties and conventions exist that highlight 
strong norms against the use and possession of nuclear weapons. However, 
there is a great disparity on exactly how these norms affect policies of 
possession and use. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) codifies international 
norms against both the possession and proliferation of nuclear arms, yet 
supports increased cooperation regarding peaceful nuclear activities.15 This 
highlights differing expectations of behavior regarding nuclear capabilities. 
Furthermore, Article VI of the NPT calls for the United States and other nuclear-
armed nations to remove their nuclear stockpiles.16 
Religious organizations attempt to explain the ethical and normative 
constraints against the use of nuclear weapons as being grounded in religious 
principles. Religious groups are not altogether unified in their nuclear policy 
beliefs. Some churches and religious groups oppose all nuclear policies to 
include the use of nuclear weapons and their possession; others conclude that 
there are ethical reasons to support the possession and use of nuclear arms in 
certain situations.17  
Howard Davis does an excellent job outlining the role and power of 
religious groups on influencing policy decisions for nuclear weapons. Overall, he 
argues that the influence and power of religious groups has never been 
particularly authoritative and that their influence on politics has been declining 
since 1945.18 One reason for the small role that religious influence does provide 
for nuclear policies is that religious organizations rarely reach a consensus 
                                            
15 Department for Disarmament Affairs, “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons,” July 1, 1968, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Howard Davis, Ethics and Defence: Power and Responsibility in the Nuclear Age (Oxford, 
UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 10.  
18 Ibid., 11–14.  
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concerning the morality of nuclear use and possession, and thus their role in 
creating and expanding norms for nuclear weapons is diminished. For example, 
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in October 1982 contended that 
nuclear arms possession is morally justified as a temporary means of deterring 
war, but their use is never morally acceptable.19 Davis argues that until religious 
leaders can articulate their arguments in the language of politics and national 
interests, religious efforts to influence policymakers will continue to be weak.20  
Finally, evidence for the existence of norms regarding nuclear policies 
exists among public opinion. Public opinion, as a venue for understanding which 
behaviors are considered appropriate, is an influential factor in developing policy. 
American leaders operate in a democracy, and as such, public opinion is an 
underlying foundation that influences U.S. foreign policy. Congress and the 
Executive Branch of government write U.S. foreign policy, and both are beholden 
to public opinion in a democratic society. Therefore, factors that influence public 
opinion will also influence policymakers and foreign policy itself.21 The public is 
an actor that decides which behavior is appropriate to them, and thus they 
represent a normative voice in nuclear policy.  
U.S. policymakers cannot disregard domestic public opinions when 
making foreign policy decisions and must always balance foreign policy 
objectives with public opinion back home. Steven Hook describes this balance 
between domestic support and foreign support as a “two-level game,” that is 
uniquely constraining as both domestic and international support is often desired 
for successful policymaking.22 The appropriateness of nuclear weapon use will 
be heavily influenced by domestic and foreign public opinion. This thesis will look 
                                            
19 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and 
Our Response, a Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, May 3, 1983 (Washington, DC: United 
States Catholic Conference, 1983), http://www.usccb.org/upload/challenge-peace-gods-promise-
our-response-1983.pdf, 16.  
20 Davis, Ethics and Defence, 270.  
21 Steven W. Hook, U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power, 4th ed. (Los Angeles: 
Sage, 2014), 212.  
22 Ibid., 82.  
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deeply into domestic and foreign public opinion on nuclear policies as evidence 
of normative constraints on strategy. 
2. Military Utility School 
The second perspective of thought, known as the “military utility school,” 
focuses on the utility of nuclear arms as compared to conventional arms.23 This 
theory discounts the relevance of norms and ethics in nuclear policy. John 
Mueller, a scholar of the military utility school, argues that nuclear weapons 
simply were not as useful as conventional weapons in American conflicts.24 
Other scholars claim that nuclear weapons had an inherent “indiscriminate 
nature, radiation effects, and so on,”25 which prevented policymakers from 
choosing nuclear arms over conventional weapons.  
This theory takes a realist approach toward policymaker decisions on the 
cost benefit analysis of nuclear weapons, arguing that conventional arms were 
better suited to material gains in the battlefield. Researchers in this school argue 
that as the effects of nuclear weapons become more precise, discriminate in their 
effects, and useful on the battlefield than conventional weaponry, the chances for 
their use will increase.  
The explanatory value of this theory can be observed particularly through 
the war-planning and nuclear polices of U.S. military leaders. Contemporary 
literature shows that military leaders often differed in their views regarding the 
utility of nuclear weapons, and that support for their use was highly 
circumstantial. The U.S. director of Policy Planning Staff recognized the utility of 
nuclear weapons in the Korean War as early as 1950.26 For a brief time following 
                                            
23 Ibid.  
24 John E. Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/Top?id=10346475, 15, 148.  
25 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 40–41.  
26 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. VII Korea, 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/
FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1950v07, 1041–1142.  
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the end of the Korean War, American political leaders implemented strategies 
wherein nuclear weapons use would be the cornerstone of army strategic 
doctrine; this strategic period was known as the “Pentomic Era.”27 On the other 
hand, as the constraining effects of radiation and nuclear fallout became more 
understood, military leaders saw the utility of atomic weaponry decrease. The 
capabilities of nuclear arms continually changed in order to increase their utility 
throughout U.S. history. The short and long-term political fallout from the use or 
possession of nuclear weapons is not considered relevant in the military utility 
theory; instead, those considerations fall into a third school of thought. 
3. Logic-of-Consequences School 
The third school of thought places little emphasis on the value of norms in 
nuclear policy and instead focuses on a realist understanding of the logic-of-
consequences (LoC).28 This line of thinking places explanatory value for the non-
use of nuclear arms on policymaker’s strategic cost and benefits analysis, 
broader than military utility, regarding their use. Theorists in this school focus on 
how policymakers weigh the short-term gains that nuclear weapons offer against 
the potential long-term consequences of their use.  
This school differs from the LoA school regarding the role of norms. 
Specifically, the LoA school would argue that nuclear behavior is governed by an 
actor’s personal beliefs and moral constructs, the LoC theory would argue that an 
actor’s personal beliefs do not factor into their behavior; instead the actor is only 
concerned with how others would view their behavior. If an actor concludes that 
there is more to be gained than lost from one type of behavior, then they will 
choose the behavior that benefits them most. Norms represent an external 
constraint for the LoC school, rather than an internal one. 
                                            
27 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/
group/04437998-a701-4c28-b26d-c673be566d7f/Week%206%20Readings/
ADA956178%20Pentomic%20Era.pdf, 103–104.  
28 Sagan, Press, and Valentino, “Atomic Aversion,” 2.  
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Nuclear deterrence, a prominent theory under the umbrella of the LoC 
school, is explained as a policy that is rooted in rational leaders refusing to use 
nuclear weapons out of fear that retaliation for such an attack will outweigh any 
benefits of their use.29 Military documents express the goal of nuclear deterrence 
was to “discourage potentially aggressive states from taking steps that might 
bring on a new world war.”30 Rational leaders would calculate that the 
consequences of using nuclear weapons would be so severe, that they would 
choose not to use them on those grounds. Furthermore, possession of nuclear 
arms will act to deter other rational leaders as well.31 It is widely understood that 
deterrence theory had a significant effect on U.S. nuclear policy.32 This theory 
finds well-documented support in Washington’s explicit nuclear policies, to 
include National Security Council documents33 and Nuclear Posture Reviews.34  
4. Tradition of Non-Use 
T. V. Paul describes the tradition of non-use as the concept that the 
unwillingness to use nuclear weapons is “attributed to an informal norm inherent 
in the tradition of non-use, which has gradually emerged since 1945.”35 Thomas 
Schelling declares that this tradition of nuclear abstinence was an unintended 
result of nuclear non-use during the 1950s, and that the tradition on non-use 
                                            
29 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB137-1/, viii–ix.  
30 George F. Lemmer, The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence 1951–1960 (Washington, DC: 
USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb249/
doc09.pdf, 1.  
31 Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An 
Enduring Debate, ed. Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013).  
32 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age; Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World 
Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 291–324.  
33 National Security Council, NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National 
Security (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 1950), www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-
68.htm.  
34 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, xii–xiii.  
35 T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 1.  
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grows with every circumstance that nuclear arms are not used in conflict.36 The 
difference between a tradition and a norm is subtle but important. A tradition is a 
self-perpetuating behavior that has continued over time largely because 
decisions to alter such a behavior were not desired. Traditions can persist, not 
because a behavior is deemed right or wrong, but simply because it has been 
done before and there is no desire to change that precedent.37 
Leading scholars in the tradition of non-use theory argue that a tradition of 
non-use began with Truman’s attempts to categorize the atomic bomb as 
inherently different from conventional weapons.38 Ever since this form of nuclear 
behavior was chosen, nations have feared breaking this tradition as it might set a 
precedent for nuclear behaviors that are unwanted. There is not necessarily a 
normative reason to refrain from using nuclear weapons, but simply a desire to 
maintain the status-quo of non-use. A traditional behavior of non-use developed 
despite the explicit National Security Council (NSC) 68 and NSC 162 policies that 
allowed for their use, showing evidence that this behavior was not normatively 
based.  
Schelling proclaims that America’s decision to abstain from the use of 
atomic weaponry was an act of unacknowledged arms control that inadvertently 
strengthened norms against nuclear use.39 Today’s U.S. Nuclear Posture 
Review still calls for nuclear use in the defense of allies and those underneath an 
American “nuclear umbrella.”40 Overall, the tradition of non-use theory combines 
realist notions of national interests and discounts the power of norms to explain 
why policymakers are constrained against using nuclear weapons.  
Theorists in this school argue that nuclear policies are not shaped by 
norms, but instead out of fear that the security of the United States may be 
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39 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 297. 
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 13
negatively affected by violating the precedent of nuclear abstinence. Morality is 
not the variable that concerns scholars of this school of thought; it is the material 
consequences of violating a tradition that explains policymaker decisions. Finally, 
this school of thought finds that traditions themselves can lead to the 
development of norms. For example, Paul argues that “the normative prohibition 
inherent in the tradition is informal and intermediate,” because the norm is not yet 
universal or codified in law among the “majority of nuclear states.”41  
Theories of appropriateness, military utility, consequences, and tradition 
all focus heavily on nuclear use policies and do not pay adequate attention to 
nuclear possession policies. Additional research is needed to determine how 
norms affected varying forms of nuclear use as well as nuclear possession 
decisions.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Nina Tannenwald and T. V. Paul’s books, The Nuclear Taboo and The 
Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, respectively, are great case studies 
for answering this thesis’ research question. These two books offer theories from 
the LoA, military utility, LoC, and tradition of non-use schools for the role of 
norms in nuclear policy, and their supporting evidence covers the entirety of the 
nuclear age. This thesis will draw evidence from the same cases as Tannenwald 
and Paul, but emphasize the differences between how norms affected nuclear 
possession policies verses how they affected nuclear use policies. Tannenwald 
places norms as the largest explanatory factor in the non-use of nuclear 
weapons since 1945. Paul emphasizes that non-use of nuclear weapons was not 
normatively constrained, instead the decision to abstain from their use created an 
informal norm against their use; an informal norm that continues today. These 
arguments are the primary starting point for this thesis because they are 
concentrated on the role that norms play in constraining U.S. nuclear policy, and 
because these books use evidence from throughout the Cold War. 
                                            
41 Paul, Tradition of Non-Use, 197. 
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It is possible that the evidence interpretations used by Tannenwald, Paul, 
and other theorists, misrepresent how norms affected nuclear policies by failing 
to distinguish a difference between their explanatory power for differing nuclear 
policies. Nuclear use policy is circumstantial, and norms that affect first-use 
policies might very well differ from those concerning retaliatory-use. Uncovering 
evidence that norms concerning nuclear weapons are variable, depending on 
circumstances surrounding their use or possession, highlights that some areas of 
nuclear policy have been overlooked or misrepresented.  
Starting from 1945, Tannenwald and Paul use primary and secondary 
sources to defend their argument that norms against the use of nuclear weapons 
have slowly strengthened over time. This thesis will use an analytical method that 
differentiates between norms regarding nuclear use and possession policies. 
Research will also delve into primary source documents that detail how norms 
regarding U.S. nuclear policy were discussed and understood by policymakers 
during times when critical changes to American nuclear policy were publicized. 
Washington’s explicit policies may not always match the actions and interests of 
policymakers behind the scenes. This thesis will highlight areas where explicit 
nuclear policies diverged from the tacit and prevailing norms that policymakers 
espoused during their development and implementation. Understanding the 
differences between America’s explicit and implicit nuclear policies will be critical 
to explaining how norms affected U.S. nuclear policy.  
Subsequent chapters are organized in a chronological format that starts in 
1945, builds through the Korean, Vietnam, Gulf, and Cold Wars, and concludes 
with how norms affect U.S. nuclear policy today. This organization follows the 
research and organization of Tannenwald and Paul’s arguments, and allows 
comparisons based on the same evidence to show how normative constraints 
have changed over time.  
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II. EARLY COLD WAR AND KOREAN WAR ERA 
Somehow or other we must manage to remove the taboo from the 
use of these weapons.  
—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, October 195342 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The substantial influence that norms placed on the use of nuclear 
weapons in the early Cold War is evident in the proclamation by Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles. When this statement was made, America was at the 
start of the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union, as well as battling a hot 
war in Korea. Policymakers in the early 1950s had to determine America’s 
nuclear policy at a time when “the moral, psychological, and political questions 
involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due 
weight.”43 This era represents a vital case study for understanding the interplay 
between norms and U.S. nuclear decision-making, because it set the foundation 
for American nuclear policy. 
Evidence from this period in the Cold War shows that leading normative 
theorists over generalized the effects that norms had on America’s use of nuclear 
weapons during this time period by primarily focusing on nuclear first-use policies 
while ignoring detailed nuclear retaliatory-use policies. For example, both 
Tannenwald and Schelling argue that Washington’s refusal to use nuclear 
weapons in the Korean War was a reflection of American norms constraining the 
use of nuclear weapons, but evidence shows that American strategists held no 
qualms in using nuclear weapons in self-defense of an existential threat or in 
retaliation for a Soviet attack on European allies. In the Korean War era the 
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43 National Security Council, NSC 68.  
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prevailing ethical questions were not on whether or not to use nuclear weapons, 
but instead focused specifically on when their use would be morally and ethically 
justified.  
Research shows that despite the non-use of nuclear weapons in the 1950s, 
policymakers were aware that nuclear weapons had to be stockpiled and 
employable at any time their use would be justifiable and appropriate. 
Furthermore, it is evident that America’s explicit nuclear policy did not always align 
with the tacit understanding of the use of nuclear weapons. The two paramount 
documents on U.S. nuclear policy in the early Cold War are NSC 68 and 162. 
These documents show an explicitly aggressive nuclear policy, but historical 
documents make it clear that policymakers felt constrained by norms into a much 
less aggressive nuclear policy than these documents would suggest.  
B. PREVAILING NORMS ON NUCLEAR USE POLICIES 
A vast majority of evidence suggesting that norms constrained American 
policymakers is found in nuclear policies regarding the first-use and retaliatory-
use of nuclear weapons. NSC 68 makes two things very clear regarding the first-
use of nuclear weapons: first-use against the Soviet Union creates an enormous 
advantage for the United States44 and the American people are morally opposed 
to a first-strike attack upon the Soviet Union.45 Tannenwald provides evidence 
that the morality and American discomfort with the use of nuclear weapons was a 
primary factor in NSC 68’s policy against preventive war with the USSR.46 She 
associates norms against preventive war as “indirect”47 contributions to the 
creation of a nuclear taboo, but she is over generalizing what policymakers were 
                                            
44 National Security Council, “Atomic Armaments,” in NSC 68: United States Objectives and 
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47 Ibid., 105. 
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saying in their nuclear plans. Policies like NSC 68 and 162 do not limit America’s 
first-use of nuclear weapons; instead they only limit their use as a weapon in a 
preventive war with the Soviet Union. This is a very circumstantial policy tailored 
to leave other nuclear options open, such as plans to use nuclear weapons in 
defense of Europe against Soviet aggression.48  
Washington was planning to use nuclear weapons in retaliatory fashion 
against the USSR due to their “vulnerability to Soviet atomic attack,” it would be 
appropriate to use “atomic weapons only for retaliation against prior use by the 
USSR.”49 Also, policymakers had plans to use the bomb as a last resort option 
when there was “no alternative method by which we can attain our objectives.”50 
First-use of nuclear weapons, when used as a last resort, would not be morally 
illegitimate as Tannenwald claims,51 only their first-use in a preventive war was 
morally repugnant to Americans. Norms against retaliatory-use had not been 
internalized by the American public or policymakers in the early Cold War. 
Schelling applies his LoC theory to the 1950s nuclear policies as being 
underscored by tacit bargaining instead of explicit policies.52 Schelling argues 
that America’s reluctance to use nuclear weapons in the Cold War and in the 
Korean War set a precedent that nuclear weapons were only to be used as 
weapons of last resort.53 While NSC 68 and NSC 162 make it clear that nuclear 
weapons were available for use, only NSC 68 restricts nuclear use to a last 
resort. NSC 162 made it explicit that America viewed nuclear weapons as 
“available for use as other munitions.”54  
                                            
48 National Security Council, “Atomic Armaments,” B, 2.  
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53 Ibid.  
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Despite this explicit nuclear policy, Paul argues that the non-use of 
nuclear weapons during the Korean War was a tacit recognition of their unique 
status as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that decisions not to use 
these weapons are based on a tradition of their non-use.55 This tradition was 
started with President Truman, and strengthened with President Eisenhower’s 
continued nuclear abstinence. It is evident that policymakers had decided against 
the first-use of nuclear weapons in a preventive war with the USSR in 1950, 
when the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that nuclear weapons would only be used 
in a counter-offensive to Soviet aggression.56 Schelling argues that one result of 
this tradition of non-use was the development of political and social costs 
associated with violating that tradition.57 Schelling, like Paul, does not argue that 
norms were being reflected in policymaker’s nuclear decision-making during the 
Korean War. Schelling differs from Paul’s tradition of non-use theory in that 
Schelling believes policymakers feared the long-term effects of breaking the 
precedent of non-use, and that LoC way of thinking constrained their strategies.  
Eisenhower, Truman, and most American policymakers never expected 
that the use of nuclear weapons against Korea would be seen by the world as a 
legitimate and morally acceptable behavior. A 1950 memorandum prepared by 
the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs makes it clear that the use of atomic weapons 
in Korea will hold a “vastly different” effect on world opinion than the use of 
conventional weapons.58 In this case, the memorandum is only referring to first-
use of nuclear weapons. Policymakers, to include Eisenhower and Truman, were 
aware that there would be long-term consequences for using nuclear weapons in 
the Korean War.  
                                            
55 Paul, Tradition of Non-Use, 50-63. 
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57 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 134. 
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There was ample discussion regarding the cost-benefit analysis for the 
use of nuclear weapons in the 1950s. Prior to Truman’s NSC 68 policy, American 
policymakers and military leaders had proposed the benefits of offensive use of 
nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in the 1950s, benefits that many 
believed would outweigh the costs of a continued Cold War.59 Paying little 
attention to military leaders LoC assessments regarding how preventive nuclear 
war was aligned with U.S. national interests, Tannenwald argues that 
policymakers concluded that domestic norms regarded first-use nuclear policies 
as unacceptable.60 Evidence for the influence of norms on constraining policy, as 
well as evidence in support of a materialist or LoC school understanding both 
appear in nuclear policies of the early Cold War. 
Support for the LoC theory on nuclear use became explicit with America’s 
implementation of a policy that allowed for the first-use use of nuclear weapons, 
as can be found in NSC 68 and NSC 162. Despite a tradition of non-use, 
policymakers wanted to ensure that they did not constrain America’s ability to 
use nuclear weapons in a first-use basis because this would result in political 
costs from Washington’s allies in Europe that believed nuclear use was 
necessary for their defense and security.61 That cost-benefit analysis drove the 
need for policies that left all nuclear options on the table. NSC 68 acknowledged, 
however, that making any official declarations that America would only use 
nuclear weapons in response to aggression would not be in America’s 
interests.62 This is evidence of inconsistencies between America’s explicit 
nuclear policies and their implicit plans for use.  
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NSC documents reveal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to use 
nuclear weapons as “potential offensive weapons.”63 These memos discuss the 
morality of using nuclear bombs offensively against China, and their authors 
worry that “the moral position of the United States would be seriously 
damaged.”64 The aggressive use of such weapons, they warn, “would help 
arouse the peoples of Asia against us.”65 NSC 162 emphasizes that the United 
States cannot meet its defense needs without international support and 
alliances,66 therefore nuclear policymakers were constrained in their decisions 
on the use of nuclear weapons because of an emerging norm against their 
offensive use. Offensive use, or use of nuclear weapons when they are not a last 
resort, was morally and politically disadvantageous to the United States because 
of the development of international norms that painted aggressive use of nuclear 
weapons as morally abhorrent. President Eisenhower often spoke of nuclear 
weapons as being the same as conventional weapons, but Eisenhower’s actions 
during this period tell a different story.67 Policymakers struggled with the social-
constructivist view that it would be inappropriate to use nuclear weapons in the 
Korean War, while also being influenced by the negative long-term 
consequences that might erupt from developing explicit policies constraining their 
first-use in a conflict with the Soviet Union.  
The largest gap in knowledge regarding how norms affect policymakers is 
in nuclear policies regarding retaliatory-use. Mark Fitzpatrick argues that the 
moral and ethical constraints on the use of nuclear weapons are less confining 
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when the weapons are used in self-defense.68 Similar to arguments in support of 
the possession and stockpiling of nuclear arms, it is clear that American 
policymakers did not feel constrained in any way against the use of nuclear 
weapons if an existential threat necessitated their use. NSC 68 and NSC 162 
never mentioned any constraints on the use of nuclear weapons when the 
sovereignty of the United States was threatened; instead these documents 
sought to outline a plan for when their use would be permissible beyond self-
defense.  
The U.S. Air Force’s nuclear deterrence strategy never questioned the use 
of nuclear weapons in defense of an attack against the United States itself, but it 
did consider the ethical considerations of using nuclear weapons in defense of 
NATO and North American allies.69 In other words, nuclear use in certain 
retaliatory situations was understood to be appropriate; nuclear use in defense of 
allies was less clear. Social-constructivists like Tannenwald and Gizewski 
overlook the weakness of a nuclear taboo existing among policymakers 
regarding the use of nuclear weapons in response to an existential threat to 
America, as the evidence they provide for this era is focused on decisions to use 
nuclear weapons in a first-use rather than retaliatory fashion.  
Using Schelling’s argument that some of America’s policies are tacit rather 
than explicit would apply to nuclear policies of retaliatory-use. America, a nuclear 
capable nation, recognized that there were moral restrictions on the use of 
nuclear arms. Paul and Schelling argue that these moral restrictions developed in 
the absence of norms, but once the tradition took hold they created norms 
against their use. Despite these constraints on their use, America chose to 
increase their nuclear posture levels with “New Look” policies that were outlined 
in NSC 162 and increased funding for nuclear development programs. Therefore, 
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it can be assumed that America had an understanding that the weapons could be 
used, and the language of NSC 68 and NSC 162 imply that these weapons 
would be used in retaliation against Soviet aggression, albeit as a last resort 
option.  
The role of norms on U.S. nuclear use policies were divided among the 
explicit policy documents produced from nuclear strategists and the implicit 
behaviors that these policymakers were willing to perform regarding their use. 
Explicitly, American policymakers during the early Cold War could be largely 
classified into the social-constructivist school when considering constraints 
placed upon their nuclear use policies by norms. At the outset of the Korean War 
the United States was the only nuclear power in the world, and there were 
numerous occasions when nuclear weapons would have a military utility 
throughout that conflict. Despite this utility, policymakers debated the ethics of 
nuclear use and felt that their use would be inappropriate. Beliefs on the 
inappropriate use of nuclear weapons in a “first-strike” were internalized by 
policymakers and these internalized beliefs were even written in to NSC 68 but 
removed from NSC 162. Evidence that policymaker’s never wavered on their 
stance that retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons was appropriate and lacked any 
constraints indicates that norms against nuclear use did not extend to this 
particular policy in the same way as it did for nuclear first-strike use.  
Fear of negative reputational consequences for nuclear first-use was 
found, which suggests that U.S. policymakers felt constrained against a nuclear 
first-strike out of fear for the long-term consequences of such a decision. Military 
leader and policymaker discussions tended to assume that nuclear use was 
inevitable and that the United States should consider using the weapons 
whenever they seemed appropriate, such as in a retaliatory-strike. For this 
reason, they created policies that left the door open for the use of nuclear 
weapons in the future; when the cost-benefit analysis of their use would better 
align with U.S. national interests. These discussions indicate that policymakers 
may not have internalized norms against the use of nuclear weapons and instead 
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were only reacting to external pressures regarding the reputational costs of using 
these weapons inappropriately.  
C. PREVAILING NORMS ON NUCLEAR POSSESSION POLICIES 
Reflecting on the devastating power of the atomic bomb in WWII, the 
international community and the United States quickly attempted to categorize 
nuclear weapons as non-conventional, and the morality regarding their use was 
questioned. In 1946, the first UN General Assembly resolution that was 
considered was a resolution that sought to regulate atomic energy and consider 
“the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.”70 Religious 
leaders called for American policymakers to declare that America would never be 
the “first to use atomic bombs in any future war” and to stop the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons.71 In 1947, Truman claimed “the hope of civilization lies in 
international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and 
development of the atomic bomb.”72  
Despite Truman’s goals for regulating atomic energy, international nuclear 
disarmament proved too difficult to manage. Risks were too high that some 
nations might produce nuclear weapons despite a UN prohibition or international 
laws regarding atomic energy. The inability to create an international law 
mandating nuclear disarmament justified President Truman’s decision to 
maintain a nuclear armament under civilian control. Respecting the emerging 
norms regarding nuclear weapons, President Truman wanted to keep nuclear 
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weapons out of military control, and he continued to argue that atomic weapons 
are not conventional.73  
NSC 68 looked at the moral, psychological, and political questions that 
surrounded nuclear weapons. A memorandum from the executive secretary of 
the NSC to the secretary of state directly asserted that the mere possession of 
nuclear arms has a psychological impact that is “grossly in favor of the United 
States.”74 This same document referred to the existence of moral objections 
against the research and development of nuclear weapons, but dismissed these 
moral arguments as insignificant when compared to the military necessity of such 
weapons.75 From a political standpoint, the possession of nuclear weapons was 
expected to deter war as well.76 Ultimately, NSC 68 and 162 never called for 
nuclear disarmament nor did they speak to any ethical norms against the 
peaceful use of nuclear weapons or nuclear energy. The explicit nuclear policies 
outlined in those two documents make it clear that America had weighed the 
moral, psychological, and political questions that surrounded nuclear weapon 
possession and decided to increase its nuclear stockpiles and capabilities.77  
The increased production of nuclear weapons and technology is could be 
considered evidence that policymakers found the possession of nuclear weapons 
to be an appropriate decision. International pressures from America’s NATO 
allies and the vastly superior conventional war fighting abilities of the Soviet 
Union pushed the United States toward nuclear arms as requirement for security. 
The military utility of nuclear weapons became the cornerstone of U.S. Cold War 
policy, as is reflected through NSC documents and NATO planning.78 The LoC 
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explanation for nuclear possession appeared to influence Truman and some 
other early policymakers as they attempted to move nuclear weapon use to 
international control in order to minimize the chances of these weapons being 
used inappropriately or without regard to their special status as non-conventional 
weaponry. Those attempts were quickly proven ineffectual, and the United States 
found that external international norms were pushing it toward maintaining a 
nuclear stockpile in order to deter Soviet aggression. American policymakers 
were focused on when and how to use nuclear weapons, and there is little 
evidence in the 1950s that they felt externally pressured toward disarmament or 
internalized powerful norms against their possession. 
An area that has not been explored by leading theories on normative 
effects on nuclear policy is America’s policy on the use of nuclear threats. 
Nuclear threats cannot be made without nuclear weapons possession. Schelling 
and materialist theorists would argue that nuclear threats in the 1950s were 
implicit, particularly in regard to deterrence. While NSC 68 and NSC 162 never 
specifically threaten the use of nuclear weapons against other countries, the 
wording of these documents makes it clear that they will be used if deemed 
necessary. Rather than drawing lines in the sand regarding what actions by other 
states would result in a nuclear attack, the rhetoric instead alluded to such a 
response with terms like “massive retaliation.”79 Politicians were careful to avoid 
making any overt nuclear threats for many reasons. In general, norms 
constrained U.S. leaders toward avoiding any unnecessary discussions 
regarding the use of nuclear weapons out of fears for reputational concerns and 
credibility for their deterrence goals. President Truman was advised against 
going into any details regarding nuclear policies beyond the fact that the U.S. 
government was determining their feasibility.80  
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The prevalence of norms against nuclear use during the early Cold War 
did not prevent Eisenhower from implicitly threatening the use of nuclear 
weapons against the Chinese to compel them to sign the Korean Armistice in 
1953.81 There are no primary source documents that connect Eisenhower to 
having made an explicit nuclear threat against China; instead there is only 
evidence that John Foster Dulles leaked the idea that America would use nuclear 
weapons against China to the Indian Prime Minister in May of 1953, in the hopes 
that this threat would be related to China by second-hand.82 The benefit of 
possessing nuclear weapons, and therefore having the ability to implicitly 
threaten their use, was considered and used by policymakers as a diplomatic tool 
in the Korean War. Restraint from making nuclear threats explicit and drawing 
lines in the sand regarding their use was deemed inappropriate by U.S. 
policymakers as well as strategically detrimental to maintaining the credibility of 
their nuclear deterrence by keeping the nuclear threshold ambiguous. 
Throughout the Korean War explicit nuclear threats were avoided by 
Truman and Eisenhower, instead these leaders resorted to heavily implying their 
use. Eisenhower and his secretary of state both implied the threat of nuclear 
weapons by referring to them as conventional weapons and that America would 
“remove the restrictions of area and weapons” in the event that China refused to 
sign the armistice.83 Implying the threat of nuclear weapons, rather than saying 
so overtly, displays an attempt to circumvent an emerging norm that had 
developed against their use. It is important to note that American policymakers 
felt constrained against making explicit nuclear threats, and this is evident in 
policymaker discussions as well as practice. Norms against nuclear threats 
appear to have been somewhat constraining for U.S. policymakers, because the 
threats were never made overtly and publicly, but the utility of an implicit nuclear 
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threat which existed merely by having a nuclear force posture proved to be more 
significant than whether or not it violated emerging norms.  
Thomas Schelling further argued that there was a benefit to the 
possession of atomic weaponry for nuclear bargaining. He concludes that there 
is value in the ambiguity and “uncertainty”84 that nuclear possession can bring to 
diplomacy. Explicit threats need not be made, nor are they necessarily 
strategically advantageous, because the mere fact that one nation owns a bomb 
can lead to fear and increased senses of risk for states that might find 
themselves on the receiving end of a conflict with a nuclear nation. There is a 
strategic advantage in keeping other nations guessing as to one’s nuclear 
intentions, and to create a sense that “not everybody is always in his right 
mind”85 when making nuclear use decisions.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Having looked at the constraints that norms placed on the broad spectrum 
of nuclear policy options in the early 1950s, it is clear that the leading theories on 
these constraints fail to paint a complete picture. The majority of research into 
normative constraints on U.S. nuclear policy focuses too heavily on the first-use 
of nuclear arms, and fails to consider other policy decisions in the nuclear use 
realm. NSC 68 looked at the moral, psychological, and political questions that 
surrounded nuclear weapons, and policymaker discussions ranged from topics 
regarding nuclear first-use, retaliatory-use, possession, and nuclear threats. It 
would benefit theorists and policymakers to look at how norms affected other 
nuclear policies beyond first-use policies. This is particularly evident since a 
cursory look at this era’s U.S. nuclear policies display little ethical or normative 
reservations regarding the retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons, nor any internal or 
external normative constraints on the development of increased stockpiles and 
capabilities. Since all the leading theories that use norms to explain nuclear non-
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use since 1945 find their foundations in the American nuclear policies of the 
1950s, a broader application of these norms to the full range of nuclear policies 
will show that there are boundaries as to how influential norms are on varying 
nuclear policies.  
John Foster Dulles’s proclamation that “somehow or other we must 
manage to remove the taboo from the use of these weapons,” fails to adequately 
describe norms against the use of nuclear weapons. Dulles probably would not 
have found a taboo or LoA constraint on the retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons. 
The taboo that Dulles wanted to eradicate was the emerging norm against the 
first-use of nuclear weapons and their treatment as non-conventional arms. This 
was an emerging norm that Dulles concluded would result in negative 
consequences for U.S. national interests, a solidly LoC school mentality. In his 
time there were also few norms that constrained American plans to maintain and 
increase its nuclear stockpile. 
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III. MID-COLD WAR AND VIETNAM ERA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The Vietnam War era offers an important case study for observing norms 
governing nuclear use and possession in the middle of the Cold War. American 
presidents and policymakers debated whether to use nuclear weapons in the 
Vietnam conflict while also debating the future of U.S. nuclear possession 
policies when championing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Ultimately, 
U.S. policymakers decided against using nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War 
and agreed to pursue a policy (Article VI of the NPT) that would end American 
possession of nuclear weapons at some future date. This chapter will look at 
whether or not norms affected these policy decisions, and to what extent.  
Focusing on policymaker’s decisions about the Vietnam War under the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations will help classify the role of norms into one of 
the four major schools outlined as well as shed light onto any differences in that 
explanatory value of these norms on nuclear war planning and posture policies. 
B. PREVAILING NORMS ON NUCLEAR USE POLICIES 
For many reasons the Vietnam War marks a unique case study for 
understanding U.S. nuclear use policies. In Vietnam, despite technological and 
military superiority, America lost the war. This war was fought through multiple 
presidential administrations and policymakers that had differing opinions on how 
to wage war and how to use nuclear weapons. The humiliation America suffered 
from the loss of this war as well as the political costs associated with this setback 
shed new light on the role of nuclear weapons. Policymakers in this war decided 
against the use of nuclear arms. What factors influenced this decision? There is 
substantial evidence from this period that addresses this question.  
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Tannenwald claims that norms against the use of nuclear weapons were 
strongly tested during America’s refusal to use the weapon in the Vietnam War.86 
Furthermore, she argues that norms had become so strong during this era that a 
taboo had formed against the first-use of nuclear arms.87 Using historical 
evidence, Tannenwald claims that norms severely constrained nuclear use 
policies throughout the Vietnam War. She provides particularly poignant 
evidence that despite America’s explicit policies that allowed for nuclear use 
during the war, there was an implicit understanding that nuclear use would never 
have been considered appropriate.  
Paul concludes that a non-use tradition became “solidified” following the 
Kennedy administration’s non-use of nuclear weapons in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962.88 This tradition was established without particular concern for 
norms or ethics; it emerged merely through a desire to maintain a status-quo of 
non-use that America saw no benefit in changing. Starting with the Johnson 
administration and continuing to today, Paul argues that this solidified tradition 
will create informal norms against the use of nuclear arms. In his view, nuclear 
non-use created norms, and future behaviors regarding nuclear use or changing 
attitudes for nuclear policies could cause the tradition of non-use to “weaken or 
break down.”89  
1. The Johnson Administration 
President Johnson inherited the Vietnam War upon taking office. 
According to Tannenwald he inherited a taboo against the first-use of nuclear 
weapons,90 and Paul argues that a tradition on non-use had solidified by the time 
of his presidency. No nuclear weapons were used or explicitly threatened under 
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the Johnson administration, yet U.S. nuclear stockpiles grew to their peak under 
his direction. This contrast in nuclear war planning policies against the growing 
nuclear force posture is better understood by looking at the norms associated 
with nuclear arms during Johnson’s presidency. 
International norms governing the use of nuclear weapons had grown 
since their use in World War II. No longer did America have a nuclear monopoly. 
Internationally, a tradition of non-use had emerged as no nation with nuclear 
capabilities had used nuclear weapons in anger since 1945. After the tradition on 
non-use was solidified, Paul’s description of this tradition takes on terms of the 
LoC school. He argues that a tradition of non-use developed because nations 
decided not to use nuclear arms “because of a realization of the horrendous 
effects of nuclear attack (a material fact) which generated reputation costs for a 
potential user.”91 In other words, the tradition did not develop due to ethical 
concerns. It developed based off of materialist fears that their use would 
ultimately harm the nation using them in the long-term. A side effect of this 
decision to avoid nuclear use was the development of norms against their use, 
and they developed whether or not the development of these norms was 
intended or desired by policymakers. Paul argues that decisions not to use 
nuclear weapons were ultimately realist in nature and that when material 
concerns develop where the use of nuclear weapons would benefit a nation they 
may be used despite the tradition of non-use that exists.92 This is in stark 
contrast to Tannenwald’s LoA argument, wherein the material or long-term 
consequences of nuclear use are considered irrelevant compared to the ethical 
and normative constraints that were internalized by policymakers concerning 
nuclear use. 
In addition to the development of a tradition of non-use, there was a strong 
trend of international and domestic norms against the use of nuclear weapons 
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leading up to Johnson’s presidency. The Baruch plan for international control of 
nuclear weapons under President Truman, while failing to be adopted set the 
tone that nuclear weapons were non-conventional. The next U.S. administration, 
under President Eisenhower, attempted to modify the non-use norm that began 
with Truman’s policymakers. Despite Eisenhower’s attempts to persuade the 
world that nuclear arms were no different than conventional weaponry, his 
administration’s decision not to use them in the Korean War added to the 
growing tradition of non-use that was emerging.93 Internationally, President 
Kennedy started to acknowledge U.S. interests and international pressures 
toward limiting the possibility of nuclear use and possession by starting 
negotiations for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In 1961, the UN General 
Assembly adopted a declaration that denounced the use of nuclear weapons as 
a “crime against civilization and mankind,”94 passing with a vote of 55 to 20.95 It 
was clear to American policymakers under Johnson that nuclear weapons were a 
separate category of arms and their use would not be judged the same way as 
the use of conventional arms among American citizens or the international 
community. 
Recognizing that only five nuclear capable nations existed during 
Johnson’s administration, it can be expected that the overwhelmingly non-
nuclear capable international community would find the use of nuclear weapons 
to be a security issue. Therefore, the non-nuclear international community would 
largely support the codification of norms against nuclear use and force postures. 
The effect that international norms of nuclear use had on the Johnson 
administration appears to be stronger than those concerning U.S. nuclear 
possession policies. 
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As the Vietnam War dragged on, U.S. military leaders routinely requested 
to use nuclear weapons in the conflict and to include nuclear weapons in their 
war plans if China or the Soviet Union joined the war.96 The Pentagon Papers 
clearly show that the Joint Chiefs wanted to make use of nuclear weapons and 
that military leadership believed in the utility of these weapons.97 The potential 
use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam was certainly a double-edged sword. Their 
use would greatly provoke Chinese and Soviet intervention in the war and at the 
same time the utility of these weapons would be greatly increased should Sino-
Soviet forces come to Saigon’s aid. The only capability that the United States 
could bring to bear as a counter to massed Chinese forces was nuclear 
weapons.98  
During a meeting with Johnson, former President Eisenhower 
recommended that Johnson use nuclear weapons against the Chinese if they 
joined the Vietnam War. However, Eisenhower was sure to point out that there 
would be political fallout for such a decision.99 Policymakers had to consider a 
wide range of factors regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, 
to include their military utility, the long-term consequences of their use, and the 
norms and appropriateness of their use. Despite Eisenhower’s advice, Johnson 
maintained strong beliefs that nuclear use was inappropriate for circumstances 
as they existed in Vietnam. Johnson made his internalized views clear in a 
telegram to the Joint Chiefs in 1968 that called for the complete termination of all 
nuclear contingency planning in Vietnam,100 and these sentiments were followed 
up in a news conference where Johnson emphasizes that he “at no time ever 
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considered or made a recommendation in any respect to the deployment of 
nuclear weapons.”101 
In 1964, Undersecretary Ball wrote a memo that predicted an enormous 
loss of international prestige if the United States ever used a nuclear weapon 
during the Vietnam War, and that the consequences of such an action would 
weaken the security of the United States.102 The LoC school was pre-eminent in 
the Ball memo, as the memo speaks mostly about international prestige, 
reputations, and precedent setting rather than the military utility of atomic 
weaponry.103 International political pressure strongly constrained against the use 
of nuclear weapons, and despite the apparent utility of nuclear weapons, 
Johnson and senior policymakers were determined to refrain from nuclear use for 
fear of negative political consequences.  
A team of four civilian scientists conducted a study to determine the 
military utility of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam, and their results were 
presented to policymakers under the name The 1966 Jason Report. In this 
report, the value of tactical nuclear weapons was vastly dwarfed in comparison to 
the negative effects nuclear use would have on public and world opinion.104 This 
report, while focusing on military utility of tactical nuclear use, made it clear that 
the tactical value of nuclear weapon use was not strong enough to overcome the 
strategic negative consequences that their use would bring about.  
International and domestic norms constrained the Johnson administration’s 
nuclear policies. Johnson’s nuclear war planning policy throughout the Vietnam 
War emphasized that first-use of nuclear weapons was off the table. The ethics of 
killing and destruction appear to be irrelevant in this policy decision, as Johnson 
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was more than willing to maintain greatly destructive strategies throughout the war; 
for example, Operation Rolling Thunder was a three-year campaign that resulted 
in more bombs dropped on Vietnam “than were dropped on all of Europe during 
World War II.”105 At the same time, policies concerning the retaliatory-use of 
nuclear weapons remained unchanged from those of the early Cold War.  
The LoA school would argue that Johnson never used nuclear weapons 
because their use had become taboo or at least violated social constructs that 
were internalized by policymakers. Evidence suggests that Johnson internalized 
beliefs that nuclear use in Vietnam was an inappropriate behavior, but he was 
not the only policymaker in Washington. His constructivist understanding of 
nuclear weapon use was unsupported among key policymakers, particularly the 
U.S. military.  
Along with a largely pro-nuclear stance from military policymakers, the 
U.S. nuclear war plans during the war never explicitly ruled out nuclear arms or 
even nuclear first-use options. If China entered the Vietnam War, nuclear 
weapons use was already planned by the military leadership.106 The decision to 
rely on conventional weapons, until such a time when nuclear use would be more 
appropriate (i.e., nuclear use was deemed more appropriate when and if China 
joined the conflict), shows that nuclear use was not an outright taboo or an 
internalized norm that constrained U.S. nuclear use policies.  
The inconsistency between the internalized nuclear norms that Johnson 
and his administration had constraining their nuclear use options, compared to 
the explicit nuclear plans that allowed for their use, can best be explained along 
the LoC theory. Senior policymakers did not want the credibility of their nuclear 
deterrent and the strategic benefits of nuclear use ambiguity to be weakened, 
and therefore the explicit policy decisions that allowed for their use were 
published into policy. Whether or not Washington would have followed through 
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with nuclear use is questionable considering the internalized beliefs that Johnson 
and his administration carried concerning these weapons. 
By looking at the military utility school and LoC school at the same time, it 
becomes clear that policymakers in the Johnson administration placed greater 
weight on the consequences of nuclear use than they did on the utility of nuclear 
weapons when writing policy. As Thomas Schelling’s LoC theory states, “nuclear 
weapons should not be evaluated mainly in terms of what they could do on the 
battlefield…much more important is what they do to the expectation of general 
war.”107 In other words, the long-term consequences of nuclear use were 
considered far more important than their short-term military utility.  
The Vietnam War was just one event in the scheme of a larger strategic 
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Long-term 
consequences for introducing atomic weapons into the Vietnam War, such as the 
increased possibility of future nuclear wars and the possibility of escalating the 
conflict to a larger scale, were considered to be against America’s strategic 
interests. The outcome of the Vietnam War was never as important as managing 
the Cold War with the Soviet Union, nor was winning the war worth the 
reputational or political costs then associated to nuclear use. The LoC school is 
the most explanatory reason for the constrained nuclear war planning policies 
that America adopted for the Vietnam War. Policymakers could have expressed 
their normative beliefs concerning the use of nuclear weapons in their nuclear 
use policies, but they decided to maintain ambiguity concerning the boundaries 
that would need to be crossed that would necessitate nuclear use.  
2. The Nixon Administration 
President Nixon’s view on the ethics of nuclear weapons was very 
different from President Johnson’s. Nixon held no personal beliefs that inhibited 
the use of atomic weaponry in Vietnam. Records of Nixon’s conversations with 
his advisors clearly show that he personally believed it was appropriate to use 
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nuclear weapons, make nuclear war plans, and deliver nuclear threats. He was 
quoted as saying “I would use nuclear weapons”108 and willing to threaten their 
use.109 Why then did he never act on these desires, and instead lead the United 
States toward greater nuclear arms controls and disarmament? By looking at the 
international and domestic norms against the use of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear force postures, it becomes clear that American policymakers were 
heavily constrained toward non-use of nuclear arms and toward decreased 
nuclear force postures.  
At the outset of Nixon’s tenure in office, he implemented a nuclear policy 
known as the “madman theory.” This theory was based on the principle that other 
nations, particularly North Vietnam, ought to fear the possibility that America 
would use nuclear weapons against them, even if doing so would appear 
unethical or irrational. Despite reckless rhetoric, Nixon’s decision-making 
regarding nuclear weapons was always rational. He believed that “whatever we 
do we must always avoid saying what we’re not going to do…obviously we are 
not going to use nuclear weapons but we should leave it hanging over them.”110 
This statement makes it clear that Nixon was aware of international norms 
against the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, and his intentions were to give 
the illusion that he is willing to violate those norms in an attempt to gain strategic 
influence over Communist adversaries.111 To add credence to his madman 
policies he authorized Operation Duck Hook, which is a plan that envisioned 
utilizing nuclear weapons strategically to end the Vietnam War. 
Operation Duck Hook is an important plan from the Nixon administration 
that characterizes which school of thought dominated policymaker’s decision-
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making for nuclear war planning. The plan itself was developed with military utility 
school thinking, as it looked only at the material benefits that nuclear weapons 
might provide for ending the Vietnam War while avoiding an analysis of the 
political and moral consequences of nuclear use.112  
The nuclear aspects of the plan were specifically designed to be 
noticeable by North Korea and other nations, in the hopes that the implicit threat 
of nuclear weapons could achieve U.S. strategic objectives.113 However, when 
Duck Hook failed to influence North Korea’s actions, instead of escalating the 
operation to its planned nuclear step, Nixon called it off. In Nixon’s memoirs, as 
well as numerous policymakers’ recorded thoughts on the decision to stop Duck 
Hook prior to escalating into a nuclear strike, it is clear that this decision was 
based upon the cost-benefit analysis that the international outrage over a nuclear 
strike vastly outweighed any military utility for their use.114 Recently declassified 
documents reveal that domestic and international opinions weighed prominently 
in the decision not to use nuclear arms for Operation Duck Hook.115 
Historical records indicate that Nixon and his administration were 
significantly more influenced by domestic public opinions on nuclear war planning 
and posture policies than they were by international norms. During a discussion 
between President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Nixon expressed his 
understanding that the use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War would hurt 
his chances in the upcoming election.116 Nixon was well aware that nuclear use 
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would result in a “domestic and international uproar,”117 and that domestic public 
opinion viewed nuclear options in the Vietnam War disapprovingly. Nixon’s 
decision not to use nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War was heavily influenced 
by norms against their use, even though Nixon did not internalize those norms 
himself.118 However, Nixon and his administration appeared ready and willing to 
use nuclear weapons if China entered the war.119 China’s entrance into the war 
would have increased the military utility of nuclear arms to a point where 
policymakers had plans to use these weapons despite the norms against their 
use.120  
Nixon, unlike Johnson, had no internalized ethics or norms against the use 
of nuclear weapons or war planning policies. As president of the United States, 
he had an exceptional power to influence nuclear policies to align with his own 
norms concerning their use. Despite this power, the external pressures of 
international and domestic norms against the use of nuclear weapons in the 
Vietnam War proved to be more explanatory for Nixon’s decisions not to use 
nuclear weapons than purely material concerns.  
Nixon and his administration felt constrained against the use of nuclear 
weapons against Vietnam because their utility in the conflict would not outweigh 
the perceived reputational, political, and long-term security concerns for their 
use. Domestically, Nixon understood that nuclear use would hurt his chances for 
reelection as well. Nuclear use was never ruled out by his administration; had 
China entered the war it was very possible that Nixon would have been willing to 
accept the consequences of breaking from norms associated with a tradition of 
non-use because the military utility of nuclear weapons would be greater against 
much larger Chinese forces. Overall, the Nixon administration’s nuclear use 
decision-making was heavily constrained by external forces and norms, not 
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internalized beliefs. This is evidence that the LoC school explanation for the 
interplay of norms and policy choices is most relevant in explaining nuclear use 
policies for this administration.  
C. PREVAILING NORMS ON NUCLEAR POSSESSION POLICIES 
During this timeframe, historical evidence shows that norms were more 
constraining on nuclear use policies than they were on nuclear possession 
policies. This largely contributed to America’s decision to maintain and improve 
the capabilities of their nuclear arsenal without ever using nuclear weapons 
during the Vietnam War. Evidence further dictates that the explanatory power of 
norms on nuclear use policy during the Vietnam War and Cold War were more 
powerful than behavioral expectations were on nuclear possession policies.  
From the international community, numerous treaties and conventions 
came into existence during the Vietnam War era that highlighted strong norms 
against the use and possession of nuclear weapons. However, there are 
inconsistencies on exactly how these norms affect nuclear use and force posture 
policies. The appropriateness of nuclear weapon use was heavily influenced by 
domestic public opinion and international political expectations of behavior 
throughout the Vietnam War, and these influences will be examined under both 
the Johnson and Nixon administration.  
1. The Johnson Administration  
Along with the growing international norms against nuclear use, there was 
also a growing movement for nuclear disarmament and arms control. In 1946, 
the first UN General Assembly resolution was a motion that sought to regulate 
atomic energy and consider “the elimination from national armaments of atomic 
weapons.”121 Article V of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty established the first legal 
limitations on the use of nuclear weapons.122 The Limited Test Ban Treaty was 
                                            
121 Official Document System, “United Nations General Assembly.”  
122 The Antarctic Treaty, Arg.-Aust.-Belg.-Chile-Fra.-Japan-N.Z.-Norway-South Afr.-
U.S.S.R.-UK-U.S., Dec. 1, 1959, http://www.ats.aq/documents/ats/treaty_original.pdf, Article V.  
 41
adopted in 1963 at the outset of Johnson’s presidency. In 1968, Johnson’s 
administration approved the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that set international 
norms against both the possession and proliferation of nuclear arms.123 
Furthermore, Article VI of the NPT called for the United States and other nuclear-
armed nations to remove their nuclear stockpiles.124 
Throughout the 1960s, numerous “ban the bomb” organizations had 
developed and gained significant influence among domestic public opinion.125 
The three most prolific of these disarmament organizations was the Friends 
Committee on National Legislation, the United World Federalists, and the 
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE).126 Along with lobbying 
the White House for arms control and disarmament, they also campaigned 
publicly and rallied domestic public opinion through the media (see Figure 1). 
The political reach that these domestic disarmament organizations ranged from 
local protest movements all the way up to the president’s ear (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 1.  SANE Advertisement in the New York Times, 1963.127 
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Figure 2.  President Johnson and SANE Leadership, 1965.128 
Along with international and domestic pressures, Johnson and his 
administration also concluded that American security would increase through 
nuclear arms control measures. Regarding the signing of the NPT, Johnson 
found this treaty to be the “most important international agreement limiting 
nuclear arms since the nuclear age began.”129 Despite the required pursuit of 
complete nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, the United States 
had no implicit plans to alter their nuclear force posture as such. For Johnson 
and U.S. policymakers, that would be too high of a security risk. In reality, 
America possessed the largest number of nuclear warheads during Johnson’s 
presidency than at any other time in history (Figure 3). Additionally, increased 
nuclear capabilities were continuing to be researched by a powerful military-
industrial complex that had taken root in America; this military-industrial complex 
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cared more for bureaucratic concerns than for the newly codified nuclear norms 
that were adopted during this era.130  
 
Figure 3.  U.S. Nuclear Warhead Stockpiles.131 
Along with international pressures against the use of nuclear arms, 
domestic pressure had steadily organized to argue against nuclear weapons 
planning and use. In 1961, top U.S. policymakers formed the U.S. disarmament 
program for the purpose of winning public opinion by explicitly creating an 
organization designed to reduce U.S. nuclear force posture levels.132 
Policymakers evidently had no implicit plans to rapidly disarm as America’s 
nuclear force posture rose to its height despite domestic pressures for reduction, 
but norms had constrained leaders toward rhetoric of complete disarmament “at 
an early date.”133 Over 50 years after the signing of the NPT, the United States 
has not yet disarmed nor developed detailed plans for nuclear disarmament; the 
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U.S. nuclear arsenal is only a small fraction of its peak, but this has resulted at 
least as much from practical as from normative drivers. 
Maintaining a nuclear force posture was a cornerstone of the nuclear 
deterrence strategy that the U.S. military and policymakers adopted during 
Johnson’s administration. While large and organized disarmament movements 
existed domestically and internationally, the Johnson administration believed that 
a nuclear stockpile provided security benefits that were more important than 
meeting these growing disarmament norms. Due to these norms, however, 
Washington found itself constrained toward explicitly pursuing policies of 
reduction, non-proliferation, and arms control.  
The fact that these pursuits were undertaken largely through rhetoric 
rather than actual policy changes lends evidence to the decreased explanatory 
value that norms had on U.S. nuclear force posture policies. Other factors, such 
as increased production capabilities, better nuclear technologies, and increased 
security concerns, factored more prominently in decisions to increase the 
capabilities and quantities of nuclear possession in Washington. Dr. Dougherty’s 
interpretation of how norms influence nuclear force posture policies was accurate 
during Johnson’s administration, “In all cases, governments—regardless of their 
more idealistic statements—can be counted upon in international arms 
negotiations to promote their national interest.”134  
Johnson’s administration faced international and domestic norms that 
called for the reduction and elimination of nuclear force postures, as well as 
limiting nuclear weapons testing. Constraints on nuclear possession policies 
pushed Washington toward the pursuit of non-proliferation agreements and multi-
lateral arms reductions. While Washington agreed to policies that pursued 
complete nuclear disarmament, those agreements have not yet been realized or 
specifically implanted into U.S. nuclear possession policies. Washington’s 
behavior concerning nuclear possession pursued arms control agreements that 
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focused on regulating the number of nuclear weapons that ought to be 
maintained, rather than focusing on multilateral elimination of nuclear arms. The 
administration had not internalized nor felt constrained by growing domestic and 
international norms against the possession of nuclear weapons, but these 
growing movements did constrain policymakers toward arms control and 
increased rhetoric of the desire to ultimately rid the world of all nuclear weapons 
(as espoused in Article VI of the NPT). Johnson and his predecessor, Kennedy, 
appear to be have had a genuine and internalized desire to pursue nuclear arms 
reduction, but their nuclear policies always placed the importance of national 
security and reciprocity of arms reductions as more important than pursuing a 
unilateral disarmament. Had Washington implemented unilateral policies of 
disarmament, this would be strong evidence that the LoA school’s emphasis on 
internalized norms against nuclear use and possession were in place. Such 
unilateral policies were not adopted, and strategic and national security concerns 
for such a decision show that beliefs about the appropriateness of nuclear 
possession were not internalized. 
The relative values of normative constraints on nuclear possession during 
the Vietnam era were evident in U.S. policy pursuits of arms control and rhetoric 
of the pursuit of complete disarmament. In practice, the United States and 
international political elites regarded nuclear deterrence as an effective strategy 
at maintaining stability and peace. Rational desires for increased security won 
the day in policies that were implemented by the United States under Johnson. 
Following the LoC school, policymakers feared that giving up nuclear weapons 
would reduce American security and interests.  
2. The Nixon Administration 
International opinions of nuclear arms did not change very much from the 
Johnson to Nixon administration. Nixon and senior policymakers adopted and 
furthered the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
(SALT) discussions that began under the Johnson administration. The 
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continuation of U.S.–Soviet arms discussions led America’s allies to worry about 
the political implications resulting from Johnson’s orchestrating of the Test Ban 
Treaty and NPT, as well as feeling relieved that the growing nuclear détente 
offered security benefits for all.135 To reduce Cold War tensions the United 
States began a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, for both nuclear war 
planning policies as well as force posture.  
International norms, to some degree, continued to pressure U.S. 
policymakers toward disarmament and non-proliferation. As mentioned 
previously, America’s pursuit of disarmament and arms control received mixed 
responses from the international community. In Asia, the U.S. National Security 
Council sought policy advice for the question of, “which is the lesser of two 
evils—nuclear proliferation or the extension of more concrete American nuclear 
assurances?”136 This issue developed in part because of America’s reluctance to 
use nuclear weapons in the Vietnam conflict. As nuclear war planning options 
appeared more and more constrained, Asian nations were considering acquiring 
their own nuclear arms for security instead of relying on American 
assurances.137  
Nixon recognized that a robust nuclear force posture was one way to wield 
nuclear power without having to use nuclear weapons. Speaking to his National 
Security Council he stated that “the main purpose of our forces is diplomatic 
wallop. The possibility of nuclear conflict is remote, because the fear of it is so 
widespread.”138 He continued to speak about the power and strategic benefits 
that a nuclear posture has for diplomatic and political gain, which he believed to 
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be even more important than nuclear effects on the battlefield.139 Evidently, 
Nixon placed the strategic consequences of a strong nuclear force posture ahead 
of any international ethics or norms against the possession of nuclear arms. 
In addition to domestic norms against the use of nuclear arms in the 
Vietnam War, Nixon was also being domestically constrained in his nuclear 
possession policies. “With the public and Congress sour on military expenditures 
thanks to the Vietnam War,” Lawrence Wittner argues, “The Nixon administration 
saw no alternative to strategic arms control.”140 War weariness and the 
continued influence from disarmament organizations in America constrained 
policymakers toward disarmament and arms control. As a democratic nation, 
many policymakers feared that failure to align with domestic norms on nuclear 
policy would result in their loss of political office.141 
As for nuclear possession policies, Nixon’s administration was influenced 
primarily by domestic norms against a strong nuclear force posture. Nixon 
believed passionately in the strategic power that a robust nuclear force posture 
offered. His implementation of the madman theory is an example of his high 
regard for nuclear weapons as both as a deterrent against aggression and as a 
diplomatic bargaining tool, but domestic politics forced him to abandon that 
strategy and pursue reduced force posture levels. Under Nixon’s support, both 
the SALT and ABM treaties were passed and America’s nuclear stockpiles began 
to decline. Even though Nixon did not internalize the notion that nuclear weapons 
use or possession were inappropriate in the Vietnam era, the prevailing 
international and domestic norms concerning their possession constrained his 
strategic options.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
During the Vietnam War era, nuclear policymakers were constrained by 
international and domestic nuclear norms. By looking at historical documents 
from both the Johnson and Nixon administration, it becomes clear that norms 
were far more constraining on nuclear war planning policies than on nuclear 
possession policies. Neither Johnson nor Nixon ever used nuclear weapons or 
allowed nuclear weapons to be placed into the Vietnam theater of war, despite 
seeing the tactical military utility that nuclear weapons could provide. Additionally, 
even though both administrations pursued nuclear arms control and nuclear 
reductions, neither administration felt largely constrained to limit their nuclear 
force postures at the expense of national security.  
Looking at the four schools of thought on how norms affect nuclear policy, 
the LoC school is the best explanatory theory for the Vietnam War period. This 
school of thought focuses on the strategic picture of U.S. security and welfare, 
and takes into account the political costs for violating nuclear norms. The 
reputational and political costs of violating nuclear use norms and traditions could 
place America’s security at risk. President Johnson’s internalized aversion to 
using nuclear arms, or entertaining any nuclear war planning policies, provides 
some evidence that the LoA school applied to his decision-making; Johnson 
maintained a social and constructivist aversion to nuclear war planning. 
Conversely, the Nixon administration provides little evidence to support the 
notion of a nuclear taboo, a prominent theory in the LoA school, as Nixon and 
several policymakers did not internalize any aversions to using nuclear arms on 
an ethical or moral level. Instead, the Nixon administration was constrained 
through a LoC cost-benefit analysis regarding the potential material gains of 
nuclear weapons use in Vietnam against the reputational and security risks of 
violating norms of non-use. 
The military utility school finds the least support throughout the Vietnam 
War, as both administrations had military advisors that purported the tactical 
advantages of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Despite a military utility, both 
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administrations took the long-term LoC approach with their decisions to avoid 
nuclear use. Long-term negative consequences for violating nuclear norms, such 
as the possibility of increased nuclear proliferation, escalation of conflicts, loss of 
prestige and reputation, and damage to diplomacy, all proved to be the 
overwhelming concerns that constrained policymakers throughout the Vietnam 
War.  
The Vietnam War marked a pivotal opportunity for the use of nuclear 
weapons. Despite this, policymakers never used the bomb. Additionally, U.S. 
nuclear force postures varied greatly throughout the Vietnam War and nuclear 
stockpiles reached their peak under the Johnson administration. This is evidence 
that norms applying to nuclear use policies are different, or more influential, than 
those concerning nuclear possession. Similar to the early Cold War, the 
explanatory value of norms on nuclear use and possession varied over time and 
circumstances. Overall, American policymakers in this period tended to fall into 
the LoC category by recognizing the costs and benefits associated with domestic 
and international expectations for nuclear behavior, and choosing policies that 




IV. COLD WAR’S END AND GULF WAR ERA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The end of the Cold War marks an important case study for understanding 
how norms affected U.S. nuclear policies. Beginning with a look at policy 
decisions from the Carter administration and continuing through those of Reagan 
and Bush, it became clear that the explanatory value of norms on U.S. nuclear 
policies was not always consistent. Similar to the beginning and middle Cold War 
periods, evidence shows that appropriate expectations of behavior for the use of 
nuclear weapons were more constraining on nuclear use policies than those that 
concerned nuclear possession. Overall, internalization of norms among 
Washington’s policymakers during this era was rarely the prominent factor for 
policy decisions. Instead, America’s nuclear policymakers based their decisions 
for nuclear use and possession primarily along the LoC school of thought. 
This chapter focuses on the role that ethics and norms had on nuclear 
policy through three American administrations and the Gulf War. This time-period 
covers several important developments in U.S. nuclear policy as well as 
illustrates numerous competing norms that dominated public and international 
opinions at the end of the Cold War. Analysis of the Bush administration details 
the rapid and unexpected fall of the Soviet Union, which led to unprecedented 
possibilities for change in nuclear policy. Finally, the Gulf War case study is 
unique in that it was the first post-Cold War conflict where America had the ability 
to use nuclear weapons, but never truly considered their employment due to 
conventional military superiority and a desire to maintain normative prohibitions 
for their use.  
Paul argues that the maintenance of a tradition of non-use was repeatedly 
analyzed throughout this period on a cost-benefit analysis. Specifically, he 
concludes that policymakers felt constrained by “high reputational costs…and by 
the apprehension that the disproportionate effects for nuclear use nullified any 
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particular tactical gains nuclear use would have provided”142 In this 
understanding, Paul takes on the LoC method of normative constraints being an 
external pressure. Paul has not abandoned his tradition of non-use theory, 
instead, his tradition theory has now taken on similar characteristics of the LoC 
school due to the development of reputational and political costs that have 
become associated with nuclear use. Whereas Paul argues that the development 
of these reputational costs had nothing to do with ethics or normative constraints 
when it developed, now that the tradition is established it has created these 
costs. Scholars in both the tradition of non-use and LoC theories place similar 
emphasis on the material costs that are now associated with nuclear use as a 
primary factor in nuclear decision-making.  
America worked hard to create numerous treaties and conventions during 
this era that maintained the strong norms against the use of nuclear weapons 
that developed in the mid-Cold War period. There was a marked increase in 
domestic and international attention to nuclear policy during this time. Unlike 
previous eras, governments in the late Cold War period “have devoted more 
attention to public preferences and possible public reactions in the framing of 
their policies.”143 Policymakers found themselves faced with conflicting norms 
and ethics concerning the possession of nuclear weapons. This inconsistency in 
values regarding nuclear possession manifested itself in Washington’s rhetorical 
pursuit of nuclear arms reduction, but rarely with actions that reflected such a 
pursuit of nuclear-zero. Decreases in nuclear possession policies were always 
pursued multi-laterally and with goals of increased security and national interests 
as a goal; ideational or moral overtones for arms control were rarely internalized 
by U.S. nuclear decision-makers. The appropriateness of nuclear possession 
was contrasted against the military utility that could be gained through 
possession of nuclear arms. Additionally, policymakers considered the long-term 
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consequences of maintaining a nuclear arsenal versus pursuing a nuclear-zero 
policy.  
This chapter will look at the prevailing norms that existed during each of 
the final three administrations of the Cold War. After determining what those 
normative expectations for behavior were, their influence on American nuclear 
policies will be interpreted along the four leading schools of thought regarding 
normative constraints on policymakers. Finally, lessons from these case as to the 
extent that this variable constrains nuclear policy will be discussed in the hopes 
of improving policymakers understanding of the role of norms in their decisions 
regarding U.S. national security interests. 
B. PREVAILING NORMS NUCLEAR USE POLICIES 
If the United States should establish a pattern out there that it is 
legitimate to use those kinds of weapons, our children and 
grandchildren are going to rue the day. 
—Congressman Newt Gingrich144 
 
This quote from Congressman Gingrich, in reference to the use of nuclear 
weapons in the Gulf War, highlights a LoC school mentality that was adopted by 
most American policymakers toward the end of the Cold War. From the 1970s 
until the end of the Cold War, the United States was never provided with any 
significant conflict in which the use of nuclear weapons was seriously considered. 
America’s explicit policy for nuclear weapons was for deterrence only, and this 
deterrence was primarily focused on the Soviet Union. To everyone’s surprise 
the Cold War ended quickly and unexpectedly, and America’s nuclear use 
policies had to adapt to the new post-Cold War order.  
The preeminent case study of U.S. nuclear use policy during this era 
came about in 1991 with the Gulf War. This conflict represents a critical case 
study for understanding American post-Cold War nuclear use policies. 
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Tannenwald argues that America never implicitly considered the use of nuclear 
weapons in this conflict, but concedes that this possibility was never explicitly 
ruled out.145 She argues that non-use was implicit because U.S. policymakers 
never seriously considered the use of nuclear weapons despite threatening to do 
so, and that policymakers decided to make their explicit nuclear use policies 
deliberately ambiguous for strategic purposes.146 This decision to maintain 
nuclear use ambiguity was similar to America’s nuclear policy in the Vietnam War 
era. McGeorge Bundy accentuates the power of ambiguous threats when he 
discussed the role of nuclear weapons in the Gulf War: “That weapons are not 
exploded does not of itself exhaust the more subtle question of whether they are 
used. Weapons, and not only nuclear weapons, can also play a role merely by 
their existence.”147  
This begs the question, what were the norms regarding nuclear use at the 
end of the Cold War, and were they any different from during the Vietnam era? 
Furthermore, did these ethics and norms change at the end of the Cold War? 
Evidence shows that the prevailing norms on nuclear first-use and retaliatory-use 
remained constant from the end of the Vietnam War era and up to the Gulf War, 
as will be shown through three presidential administrations below.  
Contrary to the Vietnam War, the Gulf War was a rapid and decisive 
military victory, with American forces possessing far greater conventional military 
strength than its opponent. With little debate or discussion, policymakers in this 
war decided against the first-use of nuclear arms, but maintained an ambiguous 
retaliatory-use policy for certain circumstances. What factors influenced this 
decision, and what factors influenced American nuclear use policies throughout 
the end of the Cold War? This chapter will look into the explanatory value of 
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norms on Washington’s nuclear use policies, as well as if there is evidence of 
different normative constraints on nuclear first-use and retaliatory-use policies.  
1. The Carter Administration 
There was hardly any opportunity for the Carter administration to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, but their use was still considered as 
a possibility against Soviet aggression. Norms during this administration 
regarding the first-use or retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons remained relatively 
unchanged since those from the Vietnam Era. The United States maintained a 
strategy of nuclear deterrence, wherein nuclear planning was only for retaliatory-
use, but had shifted its nuclear policy intentions toward non-proliferation more so 
than in the mid Cold War. The best source of insight for how norms affected the 
Carter administration’s nuclear use policies can be seen in how they influenced 
policymaker decisions for construction of the neutron bomb and the development 
of the new nuclear strategy outlined in Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59). 
Domestic and international norms concerning the neutron bomb were 
greatly constraining for U.S. policymakers. No weapon since the 1960’s 
generated such a large ethical debate as the neutron bomb. Domestically and 
internationally the moral values of this new armament were debated, with 
advocates on both sides of the aisle. Despite representing a new weapon 
technology, policymakers quickly recognized that the neutron bomb was still a 
kind of nuclear weapon. Paul argues that the Carter administration was 
constrained by this reality, and therefore there would be reputational and political 
costs associated with breaking the tradition of non-use that was associated with 
these weapon systems.148  
While the neutron bomb was a nuclear weapon, it was unique in that it 
specialized in taking human life through radiation poisoning, without causing 
significant damage to infrastructure. This weapon was intended to be more 
usable than other nuclear weapons because it can accomplish military objectives 
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with less collateral damage. Indeed, strategists and European leaders explicitly 
argued that the weapon was morally superior and more useful than standard 
nuclear and conventional weapons.149 On the other hand, the way that radiation 
poisoning killed the enemy was considered morally reprehensible, and it was 
often compared to the immorality of chemical and biological weapons.150 Among 
policymakers, some had internalized an aversion to their use while others had 
not. External factors such as protests and movements in Europe against the 
neutron bomb, based on ethical-norms concerning their use, were also influential 
on U.S. policymakers.151 
Despite a divide over the morality and ethics of using a radiation-type 
weapon, the explanatory value of these ethics always took a back seat to U.S. 
policymaker’s concerns over the long-term-consequences of using a neutron 
bomb. By the time of Carter’s presidency, international norms had dictated that 
nuclear weapon use carried much higher political costs than the use of 
conventional weapons.152 Tannenwald argues that U.S. policymakers were 
primarily concerned that the use of a neutron bomb would increase the chances 
for unwanted nuclear escalation.153 Even if the discriminate and ethical 
superiority of neutron bombs could be agreed upon, the use of such a weapon 
would blur the line between what types of nuclear use would be considered 
appropriate. From a LoC perspective, the material benefits that neutron bombs 
could offer were not considered to be worth the risks of nuclear escalation. 
Therefore, it was external pressures of reputational costs and material cost to 
benefit analysis that led to the Carter administration’s abandonment of the 
neutron bomb. A LoA understanding lacks sufficient evidence of influence of 
internalized beliefs regarding the appropriateness of their use, as the 
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appropriateness of the weapon was hotly debated among policymakers and a 
general conclusion as to their appropriateness was never agreed upon. 
American policymakers were chiefly concerned with the prevention of 
large scale nuclear war, and they were convinced that neutron bombs might 
increase the chances of such a war. Ultimately, Carter decided not to 
manufacture this ethically-polarizing weapon.154 His decision to do so was based 
somewhat on his own internalized aversion to the weapon but more so for his 
fear that the use of a neutron bomb would blur the line of appropriate use for 
nuclear weapons and result in unwanted reputational costs or set unwanted 
precedents for their use.155  
While the military utility of a neutron bomb was considerably high, 
usefulness on the battlefield did not appear to be a prominent factor in this 
decision-making. The bomb could be effectively used against Soviet armored 
vehicles and infantry formations, which had become a growing concern for 
American and European nations,156 yet discussions regarding the political harm 
that might follow the use this weapon trumped the cost-benefit analysis for their 
use. Policymaker’s decision to factor in norms and reputational costs when 
deciding their policies for neutron bombs display a LoC school explanation for 
decision-making as opposed to one of pure military utility. To some extent, the 
political fallout for using neutron bombs would have been less than for the use of 
strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, because many argued that the discriminate 
effects of these weapons were morally superior to those of traditional nuclear 
arms. If this argument had been internalized by domestic and international 
actors, then U.S. policymakers would not have felt as constrained against the 
use of neutron weapons. Ultimately, the decision not to produce these weapons 
reflects that the military utility of the neutron bomb was never high enough to 
justify the reputational and political costs for their use. 
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The LoA school would argue that ethics and norms surrounding neutron 
weaponry constrained their use, because policymakers internalized a revulsion to 
the use of such weapons. Tannenwald refers to this aversion as an example of a 
de facto no first-use policy because, by the late Cold War, American 
policymakers had almost completely internalized the belief that nuclear use was 
unacceptable.157 Despite this supposed internalized norm, President Carter 
never explicitly made a no first-use pledge that was codified into U.S. nuclear 
planning documents and continued to maintain policies of retaliatory-use. The 
strongest evidence for a lack of internalized norms against neutron bombs would 
show up during Reagan’s presidency, when policymakers decided to continue 
with the production and development of neutron bombs despite public 
opposition.158 This reflects a cost-benefit relationship as trumping normative 
ideologies for neutron weapon employment, at least in policy outcomes. 
While it is clear that some policymakers internalized a LoA belief that the 
use of neutron bombs was inappropriate, their policy decisions reflect a greater 
concern for realist and material notions of cost-benefit analysis that is found in 
the LoC school. As soon as the reputational and political costs associated with 
the use of neutron bombs became less costly than their strategic and deterrent 
capabilities, the next administration promptly funded their development. Stephen 
Younger, a senior policy scholar, took the decision not to use neutron bombs one 
step further in the LoC mindset by stating that decisions to abstain from their 
production were actually not normatively constrained at all, instead he states that 
policymakers acted only out of “practical interest to limit the use of the only 
weapon that could inflict tactical defeat on [U.S.] forces.”159 
For American policymakers, the utility of this weapon was never as 
important as the long-term-consequences that might result from their use. 
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Specifically, policymakers feared that using this radiation-type weapon would 
increase the likelihood of large scale nuclear war. The true constraining effects 
on the decision to abandon the neutron bomb were based on material and realist 
concerns for the long-term security of the United States. The use of a neutron 
bomb might have the consequence of decreasing norms against the use of 
nuclear weapons as well as increasing the likelihood for nuclear escalation; both 
were considered regretful outcomes for the United States.  
The Carter administration’s development of PD 59 reflects how U.S. 
policymakers reacted to emerging norms and ethics for nuclear use. In 1978 
Secretary of State Vance made a negative security agreement at a Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament. America pledged “not to 
use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear states party to the NPT.”160 This 
decision to constrain America’s ability to use nuclear weapons was not entirely 
motivated out of ethical or normative motives.  
This decision was largely based on a desire to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, which was considered vital to U.S. national security 
interests.161 In addition to limiting which states America would use nuclear 
weapons against, the Carter administration also wanted to create plans for a 
limited nuclear war. Rather than maintaining policies for mutually assured 
destruction, as outlined in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), Carter 
asked for increased flexibility to fight a longer and limited nuclear war. The result 
was PD 59, a policy that emphasized deterrence, flexibility, and the capability to 
sustain a prolonged nuclear war.162 This plan emphasized the need to allow for 
“bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms,” and the 
possibility of avoiding all-out nuclear war.163 
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This adoption of a new “countervailing”164 nuclear use policy shows that 
while the administration’s views on how to use nuclear weapons was slightly 
modified, overall the administration still held no internalized aversion to the use of 
nuclear weapons. Unlike many other NSC documents regarding nuclear strategy 
(i.e., NSC 68 and 162), ethics, morality, and international norms against the use 
of nuclear weapons were never mentioned in PD 59. Little evidence exists to 
show that policymakers in the Carter administration were ethically or normatively 
constrained in the development of this new policy; instead, the evidence portrays 
a LoC understanding that nuclear weapons would be used when the benefits 
outweighed the costs.  
2. The Reagan Administration 
Similar to his predecessor, Reagan’s administration never faced any 
significant opportunities to use nuclear weapons in conflict. Regardless, the 
policy decisions from this administration still provide evidence as to whether or 
not norms constrained nuclear-use policies. Reagan took power after 
campaigning that the United States was in a window of vulnerability with the 
Soviet Union. This window, his administration argued, was a period of time in 
which the United States would fall irreparably behind the Soviet Union in nuclear 
capability.165 This led Reagan and his administration to initially pursue a hawkish 
nuclear strategy that focused on prevailing, instead of countervailing, in a conflict 
with the USSR. While the veracity of America’s vulnerability to Soviet military 
capabilities was false, the perception of weakness was strong in American public 
opinion.166  
Internationally, evidence of a norm against nuclear use can be found in 
the codification of agreements that delegitimized their use. A 1981 UNGA 
resolution declared that states “allowing the first-use of nuclear weapons…” for 
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any reason, was “incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals 
of the United Nations.”167 Two years later, another resolution was adopted that 
further condemned the “first-use of nuclear weapons.”168 Both of these 
resolutions condemn first-use, but make no condemnations for retaliatory-use. 
Norms against retaliatory-use of nuclear arms did not carry the same weight as 
those regarding first-use during Reagan’s presidency, because the public viewed 
nuclear deterrence as necessary and appropriate for war prevention.169 
Tannenwald claims that influential policymakers, like Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara, were pushing for an American “no-first-use policy.”170 This 
argument stood in contrast to America’s decision in a UN Special Session on 
Disarmament to avoid undertaking such a policy.171 She mentions McNamara 
was motivated both by a “tradition”172 of non-use and by material concerns as to 
the benefits of using tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Tannenwald concludes 
that Reagan’s nuclear use policies were primarily concerned with maintaining 
national interests rather than influenced by normative constraints. While there 
was a great deal of “morally based arguments” during this period, she argues 
that these appeals to ideology “were a way of drawing attention to the interests at 
stake.”173 This view most closely aligns with the LoC explanation for the value of 
norms in nuclear use policy, as it was realist concerns that mattered more to 
policymakers than ethical or normative prescriptions for acceptable behavior.  
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Reagan adopted new nuclear policies that did not sit well with domestic 
public opinion. His implementation of National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD) 13 represented a switch from a countervailing strategy to a “prevailing” 
strategy for nuclear war. The creation of this strategy was partially a response to 
the perceived gap in nuclear capability that favored the Soviet Union.174 This 
directive, while still intended as a deterrent policy that only provided for 
retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons,175 nevertheless was perceived by many as 
the start of a new, dangerous, and unnecessary arms race.176 NSDD 13’s 
strategies of prevailing in nuclear war appeared to be irrational to the American 
public.177 Increased public scrutiny and activism in nuclear politics constrained 
Reagan and his administrators toward new nuclear use policies, one of which 
was the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative program.178  
The switch from a policy of “mutually assured destruction to mutual 
assured survival”179 was largely undertaken in response to changing norms for 
nuclear use that constrained Reagan’s nuclear policies. The inconsistency 
between growing stigmas against the first-use of nuclear weapons and U.S. 
deterrent policies, which relied upon the threat of retaliatory-use, became a 
political issue throughout Reagan’s presidency.180 The appropriateness of 
nuclear deterrence’s reliance on mutual destruction was increasingly considered 
illegitimate by domestic public opinion. This change in expectations of legitimate 
behavior is particularly explanatory for Reagan’s pursuit of the SDI program and 
arms control treaties as a means to address these new norms, both of which will 
be explored further in the nuclear possession section of this chapter.  
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3. The Bush Administration 
The Bush administration offers unique case studies for normative effects 
on nuclear policy. In addition to having to navigate new security paradigms that 
emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this regime also encountered the 
first post-Cold War conflict in which America could have used nuclear weapons in 
combat. Nuclear use policies from this era highlight a clear distinction between 
first-use and retaliatory-use policies, and there is evidence that the explicit 
policies that existed regarding nuclear use did not align with policymaker’s 
implicit plans for their employment. 
The fall of the Warsaw Pact signaled an abrupt shift in conventional 
military power that greatly favored the United States and NATO allies.181 This 
shift in power made the reliance on nuclear weapons, as an equalizer for 
conventional weakness, no longer valid for the United States. In the absence of 
Soviet Russia’s powerful conventional military, nuclear weapons now became a 
threat to America’s conventional military superiority. William Epstein, an expert 
on disarmament, makes the argument that when the United States had a 
strategic advantage in nuclear capabilities and testing, it would be logical for 
America to then support arms control measures that maintain this advantage.182 
Arms control measures, he states, would “practically ensure that the American 
margin of superiority would be maintained for a long and indefinite period of 
time.”183 This argument represents a LoC approach to nuclear decision-making, 
and this approach best explains the nuclear non-proliferation policies that 
America adopted after the Soviet fall.  
Policymakers during this new era placed increased emphasis on the 
prevention of nuclear and WMD proliferation, and the Bush administration 
tailored their nuclear use policies to align with this emphasis. Secretary of 
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Defense Dick Cheney spearheaded the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy 
(NUWEP), a policy which tasked military planners to generate options for using 
nuclear weapons against any nation that is capable of developing WMDs.184 The 
United States justified its intervention against Iraq in part as a means of 
preventing the spread of WMDs, in addition to reversing Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait. The role of preventing nuclear proliferation in the U.S. decision to enter 
the Gulf War, can be seen as “the very first case in which an existing effort to 
‘have the bomb’ has been decisively blocked by clear-cut and internationally 
approved military and political action.”185 Gulf War plans were very different than 
previous American conflicts, because Iraq maintained a WMD arsenal that had to 
potential to inflict heavy costs for U.S. troops. In response to this new threat, 
nuclear plans developed for this war showcased a deliberate effort among U.S. 
policymakers that nuclear use was being contemplated only as a retaliatory 
option against WMD use by Saddam Hussein. This plan was explicit in the 
possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliatory-use, but policymaker interviews and 
discussions largely detail an implicit understanding that such retaliatory plans 
were never a serious consideration. 
The 1991 Gulf War occurred in a very different strategic environment than 
previous conflicts throughout the Cold War. Escalation risks with nuclear-capable 
adversaries were at a minimum in the absence of the Soviet Union, and the 
conventional capabilities of the Iraqi military to inflict high levels of casualties to 
U.S. troops was a significant factor in military decision-making.186 In addition to a 
large conventional capability, Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons 
that could have greatly increased the costs for American military intervention. 
Despite these risks, U.S. policymakers believed that domestic-norms against the 
use of nuclear weapons were constraining enough to prevent serious 
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consideration for a U.S. nuclear strike in the Gulf.187 While constrained by 
expectations of high reputational and political costs for nuclear use, the Bush 
administration did not feel particularly constrained against making ambiguous 
nuclear threats. 
This conflict provided an opportunity to redefine the boundaries of the 
tradition of non-use theory. Paul does not make a distinction between first-use 
and retaliatory-use regarding the establishment of the nuclear abstinence 
tradition. Despite numerous implicit nuclear threats delivered to Saddam, that 
emphasized the possibility of a nuclear retaliatory strike against Iraq if Baghdad 
made use of WMDs in the conflict,188 Paul believed that the administration’s 
ambiguous warnings were “a threat they were not willing to follow through.”189 
Saddam never used WMDs against U.S. troops, and therefore the possibilities of 
retaliatory-use were not tested. For this reason, scholars like Tannenwald and 
Paul make arguments that align with a LoC understanding to support their claims 
that America implicitly never intended to use nuclear weapons in a retaliatory 
strike, despite explicit policies that allowed for their use. They claim that the 
reputational and political costs of such a decision would never have outweighed 
the benefits for their use.190 
Paul provides evidence that America never intended to violate a tradition of 
non-use through senior policymaker interviews. According to him, interviews with 
President Bush, McGeorge Bundy, and Dick Cheney all mention that nuclear use 
was not in the long-term interests of the United States and therefore never 
seriously considered.191 Closer inspection of senior policymaker interviews show 
that many bounded their nuclear use plans in terms of cost-benefit ratios, and 
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imply that nuclear use was certainly possible under unique circumstances. For 
example; President Bush could “conjure up some horrible scenario that would call 
for the use of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons,”192 McGeorge Bundy remarked 
that nuclear use could have occurred as a “considered response to a genuinely 
parallel ferocity by others,”193 and Defense Secretary Cheney outlined a 
circumstance where nuclear use could be expected when saying “were Saddam 
foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction, the American response would 
be overwhelming and devastating,” with “unconventional weapons” listed as a 
possible American response to Iraqi chemical weapon use.194  
While no one can ever know if retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons would 
have occurred against a biological or chemical weapons attack from Iraq, there is 
evidence that policymakers were aware of circumstances that might have lead to 
their use. Their decision making was bounded in terms of the material gains that 
could be expected from nuclear use against the costs associated with violating 
domestic and international norms that condemned such attacks. Due to the 
superiority of U.S. conventional military strength, resorting to nuclear use was not 
worth the reputational costs for violating a tradition of non-use,195 nor considered 
an appropriate level of force according to established norms.196 
Prevailing norms on nuclear first-use and retaliatory-use remained 
constant throughout all three administrations at the end of the Cold War era. 
Nuclear first-use was still a condemned behavior among U.S. domestic public 
opinion and international attitudes. These norms were manifested in public 
attitudes and codified into international resolutions. Expectations for behavior 
concerning retaliatory-use were similarly expressed, and these norms were not 
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as constraining on policy as those of first-use. Evidence shows that retaliatory-
use strategies hinged largely on a LoC understanding of costs and benefits, 
rather than being constrained due to a LoA argument concerning internalized 
norms regarding the morality of their use. Explicit Gulf War nuclear policies 
heavily implied that retaliatory use of nuclear weapons would be treated as an 
appropriate response to a WMD strike on U.S. troops. Policymakers made the 
claim that the benefits of such use were unlikely to ever be worth the costs, 
particularly over the long-term. As Congressman Newt Gingrich’s realist remarks 
make clear, nuclear use in the Gulf would not have been in the long-term 
interests of America. 
C. PREVAILING NORMS ON NUCLEAR POSSESSION POLICIES 
If we elect to continue to have them, we must understand why, how 
many we need, and the purpose we intend for them. If we elect to 
eliminate them, we should understand the challenges and the risks 
that will follow. 
— Senior Policy Scholar Stephen Younger197 
The previous quote by senior policy scholar Stephen Younger outlines a 
recurring debate for U.S. nuclear possession policies throughout the end of the 
Cold War. The Carter, Reagan, and Bush presidencies represent a unique time 
where the United States pursued numerous arms treaties focused on limiting the 
numbers and capabilities of nuclear weapons that the United States and other 
nations could maintain. Scientists, diplomats, religious leaders, and policymakers 
became increasingly active in debating the ethics and expectations of behavior 
surrounding the possession of nuclear weapons. Their influence on U.S. nuclear 
possession policies could not be ignored and they did constrain American 
policymakers in decisions of numbers and capabilities of nuclear weapons that the 
public would allow. This section will look at the prevailing norms on nuclear 
possession that existed at the end of the Cold War and determine how influential 
those variables were in constraining policymaker decisions. 
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1. The Carter Administration 
President Carter took office in 1977 after campaigning for a nuclear policy 
of bilateral disarmament with the Soviet Union, in the pursuit of an overall goal of 
a nuclear-zero world.198 His administration pursued arms control measures 
through the continuation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the 
beginnings of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). While pursuing 
arms control, Carter and his administration were also faced with international and 
domestic pressures that constrained nuclear technological developments and 
force posture policies; particularly with the development of the neutron bomb. 
The strategic benefits that a large and capable nuclear deterrent provided were 
often weighed against the growing tide of international and domestic opinion 
concerning their use and possession. In the end, expectations of behavior 
regarding the possession of nuclear weapons and their capabilities appear to be 
less constrained by norms than they were by materialist concerns. 
Domestic and international beliefs regarding the appropriateness of 
neutron bomb technology is a leading indicator of how norms can constrain U.S. 
nuclear possession policies. Domestically, the Carter administration recognized 
public support for the reduction of nuclear arms and pursuit of complete 
disarmament. In his inaugural address he made it clear that he would pursue 
policies that lead toward “the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this 
Earth.”199 Despite these explicit pursuits of arms reduction, his administration 
was also pursuing the development of new nuclear weapons technologies, to 
include the neutron bomb. The American public quickly expressed their concerns 
and opinions regarding the inappropriateness of this weapon,200 and Carter 
internalized some of these concerns himself.201 
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Internationally, norms prohibiting the presence of this new technology in 
their regions was powerfully constraining for Carter’s administration. Tannenwald 
and Paul both provide evidence that the public opinion of European nations 
internalized a belief that the neutron bomb was immoral and dangerous.202 
Organized protests, like the “ban the bomb movement,” in Europe called for 
nuclear abolition and rallied public support to prevent the establishment of 
neutron bomb equipped Lance missiles staged in Europe.203 Maynard Glitman 
argues that in response to this movement, Washington altered their policies 
regarding this weapon and “began to back off a bit from its support for fielding the 
new warheads and sought to place some of the political burden for the 
deployments on the Allies: We would produce and deploy if they wanted it.”204 In 
other words, U.S. policymakers had not internalized an aversion to building and 
deploying a neutron bomb, but they were refraining from doing so until the 
political costs for such a decision aligned with national interests. Had European 
attitudes been more accepting of neutron technology, the United States could 
have been expected to deploy the bomb in Europe for strategic gains. 
Glitman’s LoC explanation for U.S. nuclear pursuits regarding neutron 
bomb capabilities is somewhat shared by Tannenwald and Paul. Neither 
Tannenwald nor Paul argued that normative factors were the primary cause of 
the Carter administration’s desire to abandon the possession and capabilities of 
neutron bomb weapons. They concluded that “strong political pressures”205 and 
a desire to maintain a “firebreak”206 between nuclear and conventional weapons 
were the best explanatory causes for neutron bomb abandonment. These 
represent material and realist concerns that best fit into the LoC school.  
                                            
202 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 279; Paul, Tradition of Non-Use, 78–79.  
203 Maynard W. Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 
2006), 24–25.  
204 Ibid., 24.  
205 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 280.  
206 Paul, Tradition of Non-Use, 79.  
 70
The decision to abandon neutron bomb technology did not carry over to 
plans for the complete eradication of all nuclear stockpiles. Concerning the 
numbers and capabilities of nuclear arms, the Carter Administration had to 
contend with a mix of public expectations for behavior. The American public was 
becoming increasingly politically active concerning their beliefs regarding nuclear 
weapons. Two competing norms had emerged, one that wanted a nuclear free 
world and one that wanted to maintain a reduced, yet capable, nuclear arsenal 
for security and deterrence reasons. These competing norms led to the adoption 
of policies wherein “American negotiators accepted the bomb as a fact of 
international life whose influence must be controlled, rather than an evil to be 
abolished.”207 Policymakers were aware of normative constraints on nuclear 
possession, but they had decided that these norms did not outweigh the strategic 
and security benefits that they provided. For these reasons, the Carter 
administration continued to modernize their current nuclear stockpiles and 
cautiously pursued arms control measures that ensured a balance of power 
instead of complete nuclear disarmament. Discussions for the START and SALT 
negotiations reflect a desire to maintain symmetry of nuclear capabilities rather 
than complete disarmament.208 
2. The Reagan Administration 
At the outset of Reagan’s presidency, a perceived “window of 
vulnerability” pervaded the nation. Fears regarding the strength of America’s 
national security were entwined with America’s nuclear defense policies. From a 
LoA perspective, there is evidence that Reagan internalized a belief that nuclear 
weapons were morally and ethically repulsive, and the pursuit of complete 
nuclear disarmament was an appropriate behavior.209 While this belief may have 
been internalized by Reagan, evidence suggests that the American people at this 
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time had not internalized a belief that nuclear disarmament was a moral 
imperative. Polling data shows that “most Americans have long had grave doubts 
about nuclear weapons…but see them as necessary for deterrence and war 
prevention,” 210 and that 66 percent of Americans supported retaliatory-use of 
nuclear weapons against a nuclear attack.211  
Four historic events occurred during the Reagan administration, which 
provide evidence for that era’s norms, and how those norms affected nuclear 
possession policies. These events include the nuclear “Freeze Now” movement, 
the 1983 Conference of Catholic Bishops, the creation of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) policy, and the development of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty. 
The “Freeze Now” movement was the largest political protest against 
nuclear arms in American history.212 This movement sought to curtail the 
hawkish nuclear policies from the Carter Administration (PD 59) and to call for an 
end to the nuclear arms race. The anti-nuclear movement had “stressed a moral 
abhorrence of weapons of mass destruction,” 213 which was representative of the 
internalized values held by many American citizens. However, in order to better 
influence U.S. policy and gain supporters, the movement’s leaders chose to 
broaden their message to include the material benefits that disarmament could 
bring about.214 Evidence of the powerful effects that this movement had on 
establishing acceptable nuclear possession behaviors is found in a UNGA 
resolution that specifically called for “all nuclear-weapon states to freeze, under 
appropriate verification, all nuclear weapons in their possession both in 
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qualitative and quantitative terms.”215 Democratic nations, like the United States, 
“appear to have become more important determinants of national and alliance 
policy.”216 This is reflected in how the movement succeeded in constraining the 
Reagan administration toward nuclear reduction treaties, such as START,217 a 
treaty that they may not have been inclined to pursue if not for the powerful 
public expressions of norms against nuclear weapons. 
Another powerful expression of norms concerning nuclear possession can 
be found in the 1983 Conference of Catholic Bishops. This conference resulted in 
a paradoxical ethical argument for nuclear weapons use and possession. While 
generally against nuclear use policies, the conference argued that the 
possession of nuclear arms for deterrence reasons was a righteous and 
acceptable behavior as long as a state continued to pursue policies toward a 
goal of nuclear disarmament.218 This is paradoxical because it represents a 
norm that allows for nuclear possession (and the implied nuclear threats 
associated with possession), but argues that following through with a nuclear 
deterrent threat was never morally justified. The document sparked domestic 
debate regarding the morality of nuclear deterrence and constrained 
policymakers toward alternative defense policies.219  
Partially in response to these conflicting norms of security and appropriate 
behavior, Reagan pursued policies that focused on increasing conventional 
deterrence capabilities such as increased support for anti-ballistic missile 
technologies.220 However, critics maintained that many of these policies—the 
SDI in particular—functioned more to enhance U.S. nuclear first strike feasibility 
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than to reduce the role of nuclear weapons overall. The defensive nature of SDI 
was questionable to some arms control advocates, as the ability to neutralize an 
enemy’s nuclear retaliation could also be interpreted as decreasing risks 
associated with a nuclear first strike.221 
The powerful effect that rising anti-nuclear movements and the ethical 
arguments from religious leaders had on the Reagan administration is evident in 
Reagan’s adoption of the SDI program. This program was designed to address 
questions and concerns from the American public on nuclear policy. Reagan 
directly references the nuclear Freeze movement when articulating his defense 
goals proclaiming:  
I know that all of you want peace, and so do I. I know too that many 
of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would further the 
cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, 
secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war.222  
In this statement he is showing that he finds material value in the possession of 
nuclear weapons, representative of a LoC response to growing norms against 
nuclear possession.  
Despite the utility that he finds in nuclear weapons, his speech later 
addresses the powerful norm that had developed concerning the possession of 
nuclear arms. In response to these recognized norms, Reagan outlined plans for 
the SDI program in this speech as a way to address normative constraints on 
nuclear policies. His remarks called “upon the scientific community in our 
country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to 
the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these 
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”223 Thus Reagan portrayed his 
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administration as shifting away from a strong reliance on nuclear weapons, and 
toward more conventional means of maintaining national security. 
The development of the INF treaty sheds light on the actual policy 
outcomes concerning emerging norms for nuclear force postures. Reagan’s 
approach to arms control prioritized the development of the SDI program as a 
means to make nuclear weapons obsolete.224 Early arms control discussions 
between Moscow and Russia focused on the reduction of nuclear arms and 
limitations on certain nuclear capabilities, particularly capabilities of intermediate-
range missiles. Later in these discussions, to Washington’s surprise, Gorbachev 
adopted a stance calling for the United States to agree to a policy of nuclear-
zero.225 This was a new precedent for U.S.-Soviet arms control diplomacy, but 
Reagan embraced it. Gorbachev and Reagan arms control discussions were 
unique in that “the two began to outbid each other in their utopianism.”226 While 
these two leaders were very influential in nuclear decision-making, there were 
still external pressures that were constraining their policy discussions. 
European political elites were not convinced that the pursuit of complete 
nuclear disarmament was in their best interests. In response to INF discussions, 
NATO leaders urged a cautious and incremental approach to arms control; 
similar to how the Reykjavik discussions began before Gorbachev’s unexpected 
change in attitude.227 Domestically, Reagan’s advisors did not think the 
president should agree to Gorbachev’s proposals.228 Policymakers were worried 
that nuclear deterrence, a staple of Western security doctrine, was being eroded 
with the increased push for nuclear disarmament. This general unwillingness to 
completely abandon nuclear possession, despite the growing norms calling for 
such action, is representative of a LoC explanation for the final INF treaty 
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agreement. Rather than pursuing complete disarmament, a possibility that was 
advocated by both Reagan and Gorbachev, the INF treaty encapsulated 
limitations on the types of nuclear weapons that could be maintained and called 
for reductions in their overall numbers.229 Thus, policymakers hedged their risks 
by maintaining a nuclear arsenal; albeit a smaller one of reduced capability. 
Internalized desires for the eradication of nuclear arms that may have resided in 
America and Russia’s heads of government did not necessarily find themselves 
reflected among American policymakers overall. 
A trend of the Reagan administration was a growing public interest in 
nuclear strategy that questioned the rationale of nuclear deterrence. It appeared 
that the American public was internalizing a belief that nuclear first-use was an 
inappropriate behavior, but possession of nuclear arms as a deterrent was still 
considered acceptable.230 Reagan and his administration were constrained 
toward addressing this external normative pressure regarding nuclear decision-
making, and began to develop new nuclear deterrent strategies that focused on 
arms reduction and capability limitations. These pursuits were not done 
unilaterally, as policymakers wanted to ensure that the ideological nuclear 
policies that they were being pressured to undertake were balanced with similar 
limits and reductions from rival states. Enacting policies that focused on arms 
control rather than nuclear-zero, such as the INF Treaty, indicates that a 
combination of LoA and LoC outlooks best explains nuclear possession policy 
decisions for this administration. Reagan’s seemingly internalized aversion to 
nuclear possession was not powerful enough to prevent policymakers from 
hedging on nuclear possession policies in the pursuit of material security 
interests. The administration’s support for nuclear reductions, but not for nuclear-
zero, represents a balancing of normative desires and material concerns.  
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3. The Bush Administration 
The Bush administration pursued numerous arms reduction treaties and 
negotiated new agreements that limited capabilities for nuclear weapons. Many 
factors converged to shape these new nuclear possession policies, and norms 
concerning nuclear possession carried a lot of weight. By continuing similar 
policies of arms control and reduction measures from the Reagan administration, 
Bush and his advisors balanced the material benefits of nuclear possession with 
established norms that called for nuclear reductions and the pursuit of a nuclear-
zero world. 
Early in his administration, Bush signed the START I treaty. This treaty 
called for an approximately fifty percent reduction in the number of U.S. and 
Soviet nuclear warheads, a reduction in the number of nuclear delivery vehicles 
to 1600, and the removal of nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan.231 This was a significant arms reduction, but the levels of cutback 
remained far from a nuclear-zero posture. Both the United States and Russia, 
even after these steep reductions, maintain enough nuclear capability to ensure 
a reliable second-strike capability as well as to guarantee an unacceptable level 
of destruction to any nation that finds itself on the receiving end of a nuclear 
attack.232 Maintaining these destructive nuclear capabilities, while still pursuing 
arms reduction, reflects a concern for the LoC school’s strategic cost and benefit 
analysis regarding nuclear possession.  
Prevailing norms in U.S. domestic opinion, and that of NATO’s 
policymakers, did not view nuclear weapon possession as inherently wrong or 
inappropriate. Polling data regarding nuclear force postures indicated that 
Americans perceived nuclear weapon possession “as necessary for deterrence 
and war prevention.”233 This norm stood in stark contrast to the explicit pursuit of 
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a nuclear free world that was agreed to by U.S. policymakers with the 
implementation of the NPT in 1970. During the Gulf War, a conflict that had the 
possibility of U.S. nuclear use, there was a notable lack of increased nuclear 
protests and calls for arms reductions as compared to the massive movements 
during Reagan’s term. This can be attributed to the U.S. public’s perceived low 
levels of risk concerning nuclear use, as well as to increased emphasis on 
strategies of arms control as a means to maintain national security.234 America’s 
NATO allies also viewed nuclear possession as an appropriate behavior. The 
NATO strategic doctrine of 1991 made it clear that nuclear weapons were 
essential for deterrence.235 Possession of nuclear arms, and the capability of 
those arms to inflict unacceptable damage to any aggressor, was the prevailing 
norm among NATO policymakers.  
Bush’s presidential initiatives for arms reduction, to include cancelling new 
nuclear technology research programs, taking bombers off alert, and other 
measures aimed at eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, were all undertaken 
with little domestic or international debate.236 The lack of debate surrounding 
these presidential initiatives was a marked departure from historical trends 
surrounding previous arms control discussions, of which many had taken years 
of scrupulous diplomacy before being accepted. NATO allies and Russia were 
eager to maintain these new precedents for “as-rapid-as-possible Soviet/Russian 
disarmament,”237 as a means to maintain current deterrent postures that had 
been successful throughout the Cold War.  
The Bush administration did not pursue a nuclear-zero standard for arms 
reduction. Security benefits that came from nuclear deterrence were considered 
as well as the costs of violating the international norm of nuclear-zero that was 
agreed to in the NPT. The American public, and its allies, saw the material 
                                            
234 Yost, “Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?,” 489–491.  
235 Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 422.  
236 Ibid., 423.  
237 Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 423.  
 78
benefits that nuclear possession offered and valued deterrence over the ideology 
of a nuclear-zero world.238 That is not to say that Washington was abandoning 
its ideology of a nuclear free world; instead, it shows that material concerns for 
national security were more influential in nuclear possession policies during the 
Bush regime. The United States still harbored distrust for their Cold War 
adversary, and confidence in the material benefits of a nuclear force. These LoC 
factors weighed prominently in America’s pursuit of arms reduction and 
avoidance of nuclear abolition.  
LoA factors also constrained Bush’s policymakers at this time, though to a 
lesser degree. Internalized norms that called for the pursuit of nuclear-zero, or at 
least reduction, were a key factor in driving nuclear force posture discussions in 
the first place. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the specter of nuclear war 
was vastly reduced and an opportunity for America to diminish their reliance on 
nuclear capabilities was presented. Norms that questioned the appropriateness 
of nuclear possession as a deterrent, prominent during Reagan’s administration, 
also had less public traction in the post-Cold War world.239  
In the absence of the Warsaw-Pact, fears of nuclear escalation or 
existential threats to national security were no longer prominent topics of 
American political discourse. This reduced the power of normative constraints on 
U.S. nuclear possession policies, but did not change a generally accepted belief 
that arms control was still the appropriate course of action for nuclear policy.240 
In accordance with the disarmament norms of the late Cold War, the Bush 
administration sought ways to marginalize the role that nuclear weapons played 
in national security while avoiding policies that would result complete nuclear 
disarmament.241 Thus, a balance between normative constraints toward arms 
control, and a LoC understanding that nuclear ownership resulted in greater 
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material benefits than costs, prevailed during Bush’s presidency. This balance 
between ideological calls for nuclear arms reduction and a desire to maintain a 
nuclear force posture as a deterrent measure continued through subsequent U.S. 
administrations following the end of the Cold War. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Stephen Younger’s quote regarding the need to decide whether to 
possess nuclear weapons, and how they might be used, was especially 
important for policymakers at the end of the Cold War.242 This era consisted of a 
rapidly changing strategic environment, wars against adversaries with WMD 
capabilities, and a pinnacle of social movements concerning the ethics and 
appropriateness of nuclear weapons. American policymakers had to contend with 
normative constraints calling for a reduction in nuclear arms and capabilities, 
while still meeting domestic and international norms that valued nuclear weapons 
as a deterrent force. Nuclear policies from this time reflect similar constraints on 
nuclear use that persisted throughout the Cold War, and inconsistent constraints 
placed on nuclear possession policies. Nuclear possession norms varied 
between administrations from this era, with calls for complete nuclear 
disarmament often competing with conflicting expectations that nuclear 
possession for deterrence was acceptable and appropriate. 
Domestic discussions and political activism became increasingly dynamic 
in debating the expectations of behavior surrounding the possession of nuclear 
weapons, and the political pressure of these debates was not ignored. This 
increased attention from domestic and international sources as to what nuclear 
behaviors were right or wrong constrained American policymakers, particularly 
regarding decisions of numbers and capabilities of nuclear weapons that ought to 
be possessed, as well as how those weapons should be employed. The effect of 
norms on policy outcomes was not always consistent throughout the three 
administrations presiding at the end of the Cold War era. 
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Starting with the Carter administration, policymakers found themselves 
constrained by expectations of behavior regarding the possession and 
development of the neutron bomb. Evidence suggests that key policymakers, like 
President Carter, had internalized an aversion to neutron bomb technology. 
Additionally, international and domestic opinion expressed a deep disdain for this 
radiological weapon and there would be large reputational and political costs 
associated with furthered development of this weapon. Both LoA and LoC 
approaches applied to policymaker’s ultimate decision to abandon this new 
technology. With Reagan’s reimplementation of the neutron bomb program, it is 
clear that his administration felt less constrained by norms concerning this 
technology. Instead, Reagan took a heavily LoC approach to this decision and 
concluded that the benefits of neutron bomb technology outweighed their political 
costs. The SDI program was also the result of external pressures constraining 
nuclear decision-making. Reagan’s address to the nation, outlining the SDI 
program, recognized prevailing norms against the use and possession of nuclear 
weapons. In the same speech, Reagan made it clear that he personally believed 
in the necessity of nuclear arms as a deterrent and that the SDI program was a 
policy that bridged the gap between norms and national security requirements. 
Finally, the Bush administration continued to balance norms with material 
concerns for national security with its nuclear planning for the Gulf War and 
planning for disarmament objectives with the shattered Soviet Union.  
Overall, American policymaker outcomes in this period tended to strike a 
balance between internalized norms and the external pressures of an 
increasingly nuclear-oriented domestic and international community’s views on 
the employment and possession of nuclear weapons. While evidence suggests 
that internalized beliefs from policymakers may have constrained how they 
viewed nuclear use and possession, actual policy outcomes (such as policy 
directives, treaties, and war plans) suggest that the LoC explanation best 




A. THE ROLE OF NORMS ON NUCLEAR POLICY 
Sufficient evidence exists to show that norms have had a large role in 
influencing U.S. nuclear policy. Additionally, the explanatory value that norms 
played in nuclear decision-making has not been consistent throughout the Cold 
War. Certain administrations found themselves more constrained by expectations 
of behavior than others. This thesis found evidence to support several 
conclusions. First, U.S. nuclear policies rarely explicitly constrained the use of 
nuclear weapons, yet interviews and historical documents suggest that nuclear 
use was implicitly constrained by normative expectations of behavior (particularly 
first-use policies). These inconsistencies between explicit and implicit policies for 
nuclear use and possession were evident during the Cold War, but there is 
evidence that suggests that some normative constraints remained consistent 
throughout. Second, internalized beliefs regarding the appropriateness of nuclear 
weapon use varied widely among Presidential leaders and senior policymakers, 
but nuclear policy outcomes tended to strike a balance between normative 
expectations and LoC school analytic thinking. Finally, the constraining effects 
norms had on policy were very circumstantial, particularly when nuclear use 
policies are broken down into categories of first-use, retaliatory-use, and 
possession. 
There were several normative trends throughout the Cold War, such as a 
general understanding that nuclear weapons are unconventional and thus carry 
different expectations and ideologies governing their use and possession. In the 
early Cold War, this norm was combated by policymakers in the hopes of 
increasing the benefits of using nuclear weapons while reducing the reputational 
costs that had become associated with them. Similar attempts to combat 
emerging and established norms against the use of nuclear weapons persisted 
throughout the Cold War, but waned as they remained largely unsuccessful. In 
the early-Cold War the Eisenhower administration attempted to combat the 
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unconventionality of nuclear weapons in the hopes of decreasing political and 
reputational costs for their use. In the mid-Cold War, Nixon tried to circumvent 
normative constraints for nuclear use by cultivating an image of irrationality with 
his madman strategy and brinkmanship. By the end of the Cold War, norms 
prohibiting nuclear use became so prevalent that leaders, like Carter, attempted 
to harness new nuclear technologies (the neutron bomb) in another attempt to 
circumvent normative constraints on nuclear use. None of these administrations 
were successful in removing or circumventing normative constraints for nuclear 
use.  
Another evidenced normative tendency concerns the role of nuclear 
weapons in U.S. deterrent strategy. Consistent norms for nuclear deterrence 
reflect a trend that possession of nuclear arms, for the purpose of retaliatory-use 
and war prevention, was a generally accepted and appropriate policy with the 
American public and policymakers. U.S. Cold War policy never explicitly 
promised retaliatory-use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear attack on America 
or its allies. While an explicit rhetoric of nuclear-zero pursuits existed among U.S. 
nuclear treaties and arms control accords, the actual outcomes of these 
agreements emphasized parity of capabilities and reciprocal reductions. None of 
these agreements brought American or Soviet nuclear force postures down to a 
level where either nation would be unable to deter aggression with the ability to 
inflict unacceptable losses on their adversaries, which displayed the power of 
deterrence to triumph over normative constraints toward disarmament. 
Internationally, norms regarding nuclear use and possession have generally 
constrained U.S. nuclear strategies toward a deterrent posture as well. U.S. allies 
considered retaliatory-use as the most acceptable rationale for the possession 
and possible use of nuclear weapons, and the United Nations developed 
numerous resolutions condemning nuclear use without condemning nuclear 
possession (so long as nuclear armed nations pursued goals of eventual nuclear 
disarmament). 
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Internalized beliefs regarding the appropriateness of nuclear weapon use 
varied widely among Presidential leaders and senior policymakers, but nuclear 
policy outcomes tended to strike a balance between LoA and LoC school 
constraints. American policymakers throughout the Cold War were often 
presented with paradoxical strategies concerning nuclear use and possession. At 
the same time that America’s nuclear use policies acted as a foundation of 
national security, the nation was also pursuing treaties that called for the 
complete disarmament of nuclear weapons. This paradoxical relationship 
between nuclear use and possession policies reflects a LoA and LoC 
understanding for the role of norms in U.S. nuclear policymaking.  
The power of nuclear deterrence rested not only in the capability to inflict 
overwhelming devastation to an aggressor, but also on the credibility that you 
would do so.243 Washington’s decisions to forgo nuclear use in the Korean, 
Vietnam, and Gulf Wars were based off both normative and material concerns as 
to the costs and benefits of their use. Despite non-use, America maintained 
explicit policies that allowed for their use, reflecting an understanding that certain 
circumstances would lead to their employment despite reputational costs. 
Internalized norms that placed nuclear weapon use and possession in a negative 
light were often balanced with a LoC analysis regarding the material costs and 
benefits of such policies. As a result, norms on nuclear first-use have become 
increasingly constraining as each instance of nuclear abstinence throughout the 
Cold War added to the reputational and political costs associated with their 
potential use. From the nuclear possession perspective, a balance between arms 
reductions and the avoidance of a nuclear-zero America have been the outcome 
of conflicting norms and materialist considerations regarding nuclear force 
postures.  
The constraining effects norms had on policy were very circumstantial. 
Contemporary normative theorists in the nuclear realm have succeeded greatly 
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in defining normative constraints for nuclear use policies, but their research must 
be broadened to accurately distinguish differences of normative constraints for 
first-use, retaliatory-use, and possession. Evidence indicates that throughout the 
Cold War nuclear norms focused heavily on the appropriateness of first-use. In 
response to both internalized norms and external normative pressures, U.S. 
policymakers generally maintained explicit policies that allowed for first-use, but 
more deeply embraced retaliatory-use and continued improvements to U.S. 
nuclear force postures. Implicitly, evidence suggests that policymakers would not 
use nuclear weapons unless the benefits of their use outweighed the material 
costs (i.e., the efficiency of nuclear weapon use as compared to conventional 
weapons, as well as reputational and political costs associated with violating 
norms of non-use).  
Scholars, like Tannenwald and Paul, have made great contributions to the 
understanding of how norms affected America’s policies regarding the use of 
atomic weaponry. To further their theories, researchers should continue to 
explore and broaden the explanatory power of norms to differentiate between 
nuclear policies of first-use, retaliatory-use, and possession. Researchers should 
also focus on how the influence of nuclear norms is evolving in the post-Cold 
War world, in which lessened concerns over large-scale strategic nuclear war 
have reduced popular attention to nuclear issues broadly, leaving international 
nuclear norms less tethered to strong expressions of public opinion. A broader 
understanding of the constraining effects that norms have on varying nuclear 
policies will allow policymakers to make better-informed decisions regarding 
America’s national defense strategies.  
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Today’s policymakers must be able to distinguish exactly how norms 
affect U.S. nuclear policy. Current U.S. nuclear policy places emphasis on the 
“prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation” as well as the strategic need of 
sustaining “a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to maintain strategic 
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stability” and “deter potential adversaries.”244 This policy evinces the premise 
that, so long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States plans on possessing 
them while at the same time preventing other nations from gaining such 
capabilities. From a LoC perspective, this policy provides material benefits in the 
form of increased military capabilities for the United States, while also expressing 
a desire to limit and eliminate possession of nuclear weapons over the long term. 
But nuclear possession for the sake of deterrence and the pursuit of complete 
nuclear disarmament ultimately are contradictory policies, and the United States 
must eventually decide between the two. Future U.S. policies must address the 
inconsistency between norms that constrain policymakers toward arms reduction, 
and the material costs of abandoning nuclear deterrence strategies.  
The United States possesses a limited number of nuclear weapons, and 
thus continued arms reduction measures will potentially lead to a nuclear free 
America. Nuclear-zero is considered an explicit goal of today’s nuclear policy, 
and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) makes it clear that Washington is 
pursuing “concrete steps”245 toward a nuclear free world. Just two paragraphs 
after this overall goal, the NPR outlines a plan to increase nuclear weapon 
expenditures, modernize their capabilities, and increase reliability on nuclear 
weapons as a “hedge against future threats.”246 The balancing act of nuclear 
deterrence and elimination that began in the Cold War continues today. These 
policies suggest that America will relinquish its nuclear arsenals and strategies 
only when national security can be obtained without the need for nuclear 
weapons.  
In order to bring U.S. nuclear use and possession strategies in line with 
growing norms that constrain both, Washington needs to find a new way to deter 
adversaries and maintain national security without a nuclear arsenal. This can be 
accomplished by developing the deterrent capabilities of U.S. conventional 
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weaponry, and by excising reliance on nuclear deterrence from the fabric of 
global security relations. For example, a nuclear-free United States would be 
unable to maintain nuclear extended deterrence guarantees with its allies. New 
policies and non-nuclear security relationships will need to be discussed with 
partners currently under U.S. nuclear umbrellas, and failure to do so may 
jeopardize global security.247 Either of those two outcomes will minimize the 
material costs associated with abandoning nuclear deterrence, as nuclear 
deterrence would no longer be necessary. This would remove a major obstacle 
constraining U.S. nuclear possession policies that rely on a LoC analysis for 
nuclear possession as a deterrent. Norms against nuclear use and possession 
will not, in and of themselves, bring nuclear policies into alignment with actor 
expectations for a nuclear free world. Instead, a combination of LoA normative 
constraints and policies that reduce material costs associated with abandoning 
nuclear possession will increase the chances of a nuclear-zero world. 
Alternatively, if policymakers wish to continue possessing nuclear arms as 
a means of deterrence, then leaders must alter their explicit policies away from 
the pursuit of a nuclear free world. Instead, policymakers should attempt to 
articulate the material benefits to national security that came from America’s 
possession of nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War, and convince domestic 
and international audiences to internalize an expectation that nuclear weapons 
are not inherently abhorrent. At the same time, the material benefits of 
possession will need to continue to be tempered with expectations that nuclear 
use is only meant as a deterrent or as a last resort option. Maintenance of norms 
that constrain nuclear first-use, but allow for retaliatory-use, would preserve a 
system of norms that successfully prevented major wars throughout the Cold 
War, and could continue to avert them in the future.  
Washington’s paradoxical policy of pursuing a nuclear-zero world, while at 
the same time modernizing nuclear capabilities and promoting the effectiveness 
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of nuclear deterrence, is unsustainable over the long term. At some point, U.S. 
arms reduction will reach a point where further decline will make nuclear 
deterrence no longer viable. Even if nuclear deterrence can exist with just one 
bomb, one bomb is still not a nuclear free world. Therefore, U.S. policymakers 
must determine, both ideologically and rationally, what nuclear possession policy 
it ultimately wants to pursue.  
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